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Abstract
The gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR) was chosen as one of the Generation IV nuclear reactor 
systems to be developed based on its excellent potential for sustainability through reduction of 
the volume and radiotoxicity of both its own fuel and other spent nuclear fuel, and for 
extending/utilizing uranium resources orders of magnitude beyond what the current open fuel 
cycle can realize.  In addition, energy conversion at high thermal efficiency is possible with the 
current designs being considered, thus increasing the economic benefit of the GFR.  However, 
research and development challenges include the ability to use passive decay heat removal 
systems during accident conditions, survivability of fuels and in-core materials under extreme
temperatures and radiation, and economical and efficient fuel cycle processes.  This report 
addresses/discusses the decay heat removal options available to the GFR, and the current 
solutions.  While it is possible to design a GFR with complete passive safety (i.e., reliance solely
on conductive and radiative heat transfer for decay heat removal), it has been shown that the low 
power density results in unacceptable fuel cycle costs for the GFR.  However, increasing power 
density results in higher decay heat rates, and the attendant temperature increase in the fuel and 
core.  Use of active movers, or blowers/fans, is possible during accident conditions, which only 
requires 3% of nominal flow to remove the decay heat.  Unfortunately, this requires reliance on 
active systems.  In order to incorporate passive systems, innovative designs have been studied, 
and a mix of passive and active systems appears to meet the requirements for decay heat removal
during accident conditions. 
1. Introduction 
During the 1960s through 1980s, gas-cooled fast reactors were being considered and advocated 
as an alternative to the mainstream, worldwide program development of the liquid-metal fast 
breeder reactor.  These designs used technologies based on metal clad pins containing solid 
solution fuel; these were essentially sodium core designs that replaced the sodium coolant with 
helium, where the cladding was roughened (or finned) to enhance heat transfer during 
normal/steady-state operation.  However, it was recognized earlier on that gas coolants (in the 
low pressure range) had poor heat transfer properties and low thermal inertia as compared to 
liquid metal coolants, or even water.  The consequence of depressurization combined with total
loss of electric power (offsite and emergency) was melting of the core due to the decay heat, 
even though this extreme accident condition (in residual risk probability space) was highly
improbable.  This early realization led to the focus on, and extensive research and development
of, reliable active decay heat removal systems.  Steam driven turbines for powering circulators in 
shutdown heat removal systems, and emergency heat removal systems were initially considered.
Probabilistic risk assessment studies convinced designers to modify these designs, which were 
replaced with electric powered blowers.  As such, emergency power supply alternatives (e.g., 
diesel generators, compressed air, etc.) were investigated, as were extra trains, redundancy, 
single failure possibilities, and common mode failures.  It is important to note that the roughened 
(or finned) cladding designs were also beneficial during depressurization events when forced 
convection was employed, but were not helpful for natural convection (passive decay heat 
removal) due to the increased friction and resulting pressure drop across the pin. 
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The gas-cooled fast reactor designs of the 1960s through 1980s (e.g., the GCFR of Gulf General 
Atomic, the GBR-4 of the European community, and the KFK/KWU designs in Germany),
eventually utilized highly reliable active decay heat removal systems.  However, the accident at 
TMI-2 occurred during this time period, which led to core disruption and melt.  This accident
had a profound impact on the nuclear community, and eventually led to consideration of passive 
mechanisms to remove the core decay heat, in conjunction with well-known active systems.  It is 
important to note that liquid metal fast reactors investigated passive safety mechanisms as a 
complement to active systems, under the auspices of the IFR program, and reactor vessel cooling 
mechanisms as alternatives.  Within thermal spectrum, gas-cooled reactor programs, an approach 
of utilizing passive decay heat removal has come to the forefront of design efforts; indeed, walk-
away passive removal of core-generated heat has now become a part of the safety case.
Unfortunately, the gas-cooled fast reactor programs were canceled before work could be 
performed on identifying or developing passive decay heat removal systems.
Within Generation IV, the use of passive safety systems has been strongly encouraged, which 
would eliminate complete reliance on purely active decay heat removal systems or, at the least, 
utilize an optimum combination of passive and active systems.  As discussed earlier, the former
gas-cooled fast reactor designs (i.e., metal clad pins) would not survive a depressurization 
accident (or loss of flow accident) due to the immediate temperature rise within the core; far 
exceeding the melting point of typical cladding.  Use of refractory metals will greatly increase 
the melting point, but can also be strong neutrons absorbers. An obvious balance is needed 
between the safety and material requirements, not forgetting the competitive economics needed 
to satisfy the Generation IV goals.  This report takes the opportunity to address the use passive 
safety mechanisms in a gas-cooled fast reactor, while trying to maintain a balance between the 
other Generation IV goals.  The down-selected systems will be optimized in future work to 
match the best candidate fuels, materials, and reactor design. 
2. Design Options for the Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor 
The following design options are being considered for the GFR: 
x Reference: helium cooled, direct power conversion cycle at 5-7 MPa, and 850ºC outlet 
temperature.
 Alternate: helium cooled (5-7 MPa), indirect power conversion cycle using 
supercritical CO2 on the secondary side at 20 MPa, and 550ºC.  (Allows for cooler 
primary outlet temperatures at ~ 600ºC, thus reducing the materials requirements with 
respect to temperature.  This also has a strong safety case with respect to decay heat 
removal systems.)
x Option: supercritical CO2 cooled, direct power conversion cycle at 20 MPa, and 550ºC outlet 
temperature.
In addition to these options, a base case can be used for comparison purposes, which would be 
the CO2 cooled, indirect power conversion cycle reactor.  The secondary side is variable at this 
point, which may be steam, supercritical pressure water, etc.  This is essentially a fast spectrum
Advanced Gas Reactor (developed by the United Kingdom), metal clad pin/solid solution fuel 
design, with modifications to increase efficiency.  In addition to the coolant, variations in core 
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geometry also exist, where pin, block/plate, and pebble fuel designs are being considered.
However, experience with this reactor can be used in comparison with the current GFR designs. 
As stated above, the reference design for the GFR is a helium cooled, direct Brayton cycle 
energy conversion system.  The other characteristics of an initial GFR reference design can be 
seen in Table 1 below. 
Table 1.  Initial reference GFR parameters.
~20 wt%Fissile (TRU) enrichment
<7 mPrimary vessel diameter
~5 at%; 60 dpaDischarge burnup ; damage
3 u 829 efpdFuel residence time
multi-recyclingFuel management
30 tonnesIn core heavy metal inventory
fissile breakevenBreeding/Burning performances
UPuC/SiC (50/50 %)Reference fuel composition
55 MW/m3Average power density
50/40/10 %Volume fractions of Fuel/Gas/SiC
~0.4 barCore pressure drop
11 m3 (H/D ~1.7/2.9 m)Core volume
330 kg/s & 40 m/sNominal flow & velocity
490 °CInlet coolant temperature
850 °COutlet coolant temperature
70 barCoolant pressure
48%Net efficiency
600 MWthPower level
Reference ValueSystem Parameter
The alternate design is also a helium-cooled system, but utilizes an indirect Brayton cycle for
power conversion.  The secondary system of the alternate design utilizes supercritical CO2 at 
550qC and 20 MPa.  This allows for more modest outlet temperatures in the primary circuit (a
600qC), reducing the strict fuel, fuel matrix, and material requirements as compared to the direct 
cycle, while maintaining high thermal efficiency (a 45%). 
The optional design is a supercritical CO2 cooled (550qC outlet and 20 MPa), direct cycle 
system.  The main advantage of the optional design is the modest outlet temperature in the 
primary circuit, while maintaining high thermal efficiency (a 45%).  Again, the modest outlet 
temperature (comparable to sodium-cooled reactors) reduces the requirements on fuel, fuel 
matrix/cladding, and materials, and even allows for the use of more standard metal alloys within 
the core.  This has the potential of significantly reducing the fuel matrix/cladding development
costs as compared to the reference design, and reducing the overall capital costs due to the small
size of the turbomachinery (and other system components). 
The safety system design will be affected by the choice of primary coolant, whether a direct or 
indirect power conversion cycle is used, and the core geometry (i.e., block, plate, pebble, etc.).
The trade-off between high conductivity and high temperature capabilities led to the choice of 
ceramics, including refractory ceramics.  The reference fuel matrix for the Generation IV GFR is
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SiC using a uranium-carbide dispersion fuel, based on a balance between conductivity and high 
temperature capability. 
3. Decay Heat 
The driving force that sets the size of active decay heat removal system, and the feasibility of
proposed passive decay removal mechanisms, is the well-known decay heat generation curve.
Figure 1 shows the typical curve for uranium fuel with infinite irradiation time.  The important 
features are: 1) it starts off at ~6% of nominal power; 2) drops to ~ 3% power after an initial 
period; 4) is down to the 2% level after ~ 1 hour; and 4) then holds at ~1% for hours.  Additional 
decay is on the order of days, months, and years.  Figure 2 shows the integrated energy under the 
decay heat curve plotted as a function of time.  Unless decay heat removal capability is provided, 
this energy has to be stored in the fuel, and, depending upon fuel heat capacity (thermal inertia), 
would lead to an ever-increasing fuel temperature curve.  Also included on Figure 2 are plots 
where decay heat removal capability of different constant capacity is introduced.  Typically, 
decay heat removal systems are designed for 1-2% decay heat.  All the integrated decay heat 
energy during the initial period has to be absorbed in the fuel.  This sets requirements on fuel 
heat capacity and fuel failure temperature limits.  The parametric plots show time scale effects 
for different heat removal capability.  The fuel temperature peaks at ~15 minutes for 2% decay 
heat removal capability, after which the decay heat generation rate decreases below the heat 
removal rate.  Note that at 0.5% capability it takes days to reach the peak.  Confinement systems
would have to be designed for a duty period of days.  If a secondary pressurization system
approach is taken for passive decay heat removal, a design period of days may be very 
challenging.  However, one of the key design variables could be adjusted so that the fuel and 
structure temperatures could be tolerated from the structural design point of view.  The key 
design variable is the rated fuel power density.  Certainly fuel heat capacity could also be 
adjusted depending upon the choice of materials selected since 
qT = cU
 
(1)
where T=temperature
 = material densityU
c = material heat capacity
...
q  = fuel power density
Figure 3 shows the heat absorption capacity required for a given decay heat removal capability.
However, as will be seen later, the selection of materials is limited.  For the GFR, one of the 
major design goals for the reactor is the thermo-chemical production of hydrogen using process 
heat.  Currently, the list of envisioned thermo-chemical reactions for reactor production of 
hydrogen are all high temperature reactions at  800ºC.  At these temperatures, and under the 
high fluence conditions of the GFR, the material limits are very challenging.  The material
options for GFR core and structures are very limited.  Much more flexibility is available in the 
selection of power density.  As can be seen from equation (1), power density affects time scales 
and Figure 2 shows the importance of time scale. 
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Figure 1.  Decay Heat Curve for Uranium-Fueled Reactors 
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Figure 2.  Stored Energy for Parametric Values of Decay Heat Removal Rate 
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Figure 3.  Maximum Stored Energy 
Not only is the time scale important for Figure 2, but it also requires time to transport heat 
through conduction, radiation, or convection. These are all potential passive heat removal
mechanisms.  Subsequent sections will emphasize the importance of time scales in the discussion
of potential passive decay heat removal mechanisms.  Twenty-five years ago, the GA GCFR was 
rated at 250 W/cc fuel power density.  Typical projected LMFBR numbers were even higher in 
the 300-500 W/cc range.  EBR-2, the 60 MW sodium cooled fast reactor that was designed, built, 
and operated at ANL, had a rated power density of 700 W/cc.  Sodium has excellent heat transfer 
characteristics, heat capacity properties, and natural convection capabilities even at low pressure.
However, gas coolant requires pressurization, and, for reasonable design pressures, requires a 
lower core fuel power density then the sodium coolant.  Note, however, LWRs run at ~ 100 w/cc 
and water is acknowledged to be a better heat transfer medium than gas.  Furthermore, thermal
gas cooled reactors (HTGRs and PBMRs) operate at power densities of 5 w/cc which is low 
compared to the other reactor typesa.  For a given reactor power, thermal gas cooled reactors 
have the largest primary systems.  The low power density is a key factor in the passive safety 
case of the HTGR/PBMR.  The time scale for decay heat removal transients is much larger.
Certainly the good thermal conductivity and heat capacity of graphite, coupled with the high 
disruption temperature, are important factors in the passive safety case; but the low power
density is paramount.  To derate the core by reducing the power density is a possibility for the 
GFR, but it invites economic disincentives.  A low power density would increase core size and 
related primary system size, and therefore capital costs.  But more importantly, from the 
viewpoint of fuel cycle costs and plant costs, a low core power density would have a significant 
impact.
a It is important to note, however, that the specific power (W/g) of thermal spectrum gas reactors is relatively high 
due to the low heavy metal density.
8
This is because core power density and specific power are related by 
(2)
...
sp
q pU 
where:
spp fuel specific power (watts/gm) 
As shown in [4], fuel cycle costs are related to fuel specific power.  Fuel cycle cost in mills per 
kilowatt hour (mills/kW-hr) normalized as of the start of irradiation is given by: 
-xT
d
C XTfcc = mills/kW-hr
24 B 1-eK
§ · § ·
¨ ¸ ¨ ¸  © ¹© ¹
 (3) 
where:
C = Cost per kilogram of fuel as of the start of irradiation 
 =K  Plant thermodynamic efficiency, 
dB = Fuel discharge burnup, 
X = Discount rate 
T = dB
0.365 SP L 
, duration of fuel residence in core in years 
L = Plant capacity factor, 
SP = Specific power 
Since recycle costs have at this point significant uncertainty, the point to be made is illustrated
by using a uranium start-up core for the GFR.  It can be seen from equation (2) that the higher 
the rated SP, the harder the fuel is worked, and the higher the rate of energy extraction.  This 
results in a better rate of return in terms of the time value of money invested in the fuel.
Reference [4] indicates that for fuel cycle costs (in mill/kwh) comparable to those of current
PWRs, SP needs to be > 25 W/g.  For the typical density of fuels and materials currently 
considered by the NERI and I-NERI GFR projects, this translates to a power density of ~70-100 
W/cc.  To summarize, fuel power density is an important parameter in the feasibility of proposed 
passive decay heat removal mechanisms.  Reducing fuel power density would aid the safety case.
However, economics (and in particular fuel cycle economics) sets the lower limits on the power 
density.  A power density range of 70-100 W/cc appears to be acceptable.
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4. Passive, Semi-Passive, and Active Systems 
As regards design strategy to insure low core damage frequency, two distinct approaches have 
evolved:
 Strategy 1:
a. Three, 50% capable, shutdown cooling system (SCS) active loops. 
b. One, 100% capable, emergency cooling system (ECS) passive loop. 
c. A prestressed concrete vessel (PCRV) guard vessel enclosing the reactor and 
power conversion unit so as to insure maintenance of high post-LOCA 
ambient pressure – to facilitate both natural and forced convection. 
 Strategy 2:
a. Adoption of a PCRV (or preferably PCIV: prestressed cast iron vessel) and an 
indirect cycle to reduce LOCA probability and rate of blowdown. 
b. Three, 50% capable, combined SCS/ECS auxiliary loops inside the reactor
vessel.  The SCS is active, while the ECS mode is semi-passive (as described 
subsequently).
c. Use of rugged, reliable, compact HeatricTM printed circuit heat exchangers for 
both IHX and auxiliary loop service.  Their small size allows emplacement
inside the PCRV/PCIV.
A description of the heat transfer components of these designs can be found in the sections that 
follow.
4.1 Fully Passive Option 
As was discussed previously, it is possible to design a gas-cooled fast reactor that utilizes fully
passive decay heat removal mechanisms (i.e., reliance on conduction, radiation, and natural 
convection).  Previous work using the optional design, cooled by supercritical CO2, and utilizing 
a metal matrix core was studied [17].  Figures 4 and 5 shows the peak temperatures for this 
design.  Note that the peak temperature in all cases is < 1200ºC; well below the melting
temperature of the fuel or matrix.  If a ceramic-based core were to be used in this case, the 
margins would be even greater.  In summary, this particular design has the same walk-away 
safety characteristics of its thermal spectrum counterparts, and operates at only a slightly higher 
power density (~ 8 W/cc).  In addition, this design also exhibits the following characteristics:
x Solid fuel blocks – no core compaction scenario and associated reactivity increase and
energy release 
x High thermal storage and conductivity – passive decay heat removal in loss of coolant 
accident – LOCA concerns eliminated
x Can be designed with acceptable reactivity increase from coolant voiding
x Negative fuel temperature feedbacks – inherent shutdown in accidents leading to fuel 
temperature increase
x Small reactivity swing – transient overpower eliminated
x Excellent matrix fission product retention capability - less fission product release 
Figure 6 illustrates the high fuel cycle costs as discussed in the previous section.
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Unfortunately, the first core fuel cycle costs in this design can be equal to the capital costs of the 
reactor.  Clearly the economics of this design outweigh the safety case, even though true passive 
safety is achieved.  However, the lessons learned from this exercise give insights as to the 
possible mechanisms that may be available for decay heat removal, and are discussed throughout
this report.
4.2 Prestressed Vessels 
Reference [11] reviews lessons-learned from the GCFR design projects of the 1970 time frame,
and basically re-affirms many of the decisions made during that era.  Thus our approach has been 
primarily to update and improve upon these prior efforts.  Reference [4] describes a generic 
model developed and exercised for natural or forced convection core cooling loops in support of 
our performance assessment activities.
Accordingly, minimization of LOCA probability is given a high priority.  We have concluded 
that this could best be done using a PCRV or PCIV.  Both direct and indirect power cycle
versions are being evaluated. Specifically, the prestressed cast iron reactor vessel, considered
from time-to-time in the past, and specified for the VHTR designed by Westinghouse 
Astronuclear, again in the 1970’s, is our current reference design [12] and can be seen in Figure 
7.
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Figure 7. VHTR for Process Heat as Designed by WANL
This PCIV can accommodate an HTGR rated at 3000 MWth.  It has a dozen circumferential 
cylindrical heat exchanger/machinery pods surrounding the core barrel, which house 
intermediate He/He heat exchangers, auxiliary cooling loops, and gas turbine power units.  This
layout is a good fit to current GFR needs, except that in the indirect version the power cycle — 
supercritical CO2 Brayton units—will be located outside the PCIV.  The configuration is also 
ideal for HeatricTM type heat exchangers, which are a recent (late 1980’s) development.
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The GA GCFR of the 1970’s employed three auxiliary cooling loops.  Based upon a PRA 
assessment, we have confirmed that the use of three 50% capable loops is to be preferred due to 
the limitation imposed by common mode failures.  Figure 8 includes the beta factor (=0.1) 
common cause consideration and the rare event approximation, thus illustrating a reasonable 
estimate of system failure probability for the respective component failure probabilities.
To further reduce system failure probability, passive gas accumulators that can power the gas 
turbines used to drive auxiliary loop gas blowers have been added, as shown in Figure 9.   This 
approach was employed to increase the diversity of emergency power sources, since failure to 
provide service by diesel generators is typically the dominant event in LWR severe accident
scenarios.  During a LOCA the CO2 accumulators discharge through a valve normally held shut 
by primary loop pressure.  The turbine exhausts into the primary system, thereby providing CO2
makeup replacing He; the former is much more effective under natural convection.  In the event
of station blackout without primary system depressurization, the CO2 accumulators discharge
through a valve normally held shut by station electricity, to power a pneumatic motor on the 
compressor driveshaft; in this case the CO2 is vented to the atmosphere.
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Figure 9.  Pneumatically-powered Decay Heat Removal System for
Gas-Cooled Fast Reactors
4.4.1 Reactor Physics Considerations 
Another issue of concern in GFR safety analysis is the presence of positive coolant void
reactivity.  In general it is positive for both He and CO2, and for particular combinations of 
composition, configuration and normal coolant pressure, can exceed one dollar.  Accordingly we 
have investigated means for its mitigation, including modification of core and reflector
composition, core shape (pancaking, streaming assemblies), and passive reactivity feedback 
devices.
The most promising approach appears to be use of a titanium reflector.  Full particulars are 
reported in a Global 2003 paper [13]. 
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We have also described three reactivity feedback devices in the transactions for the November
2003 ANS/ENS International Winter Meeting [14][15][16].  At present further development is 
being held in abeyance, pending a fuller exploration of the use of composition control. 
4.3 Mechanisms
Focusing on the core design, in particular on fuel forms, and the implications of alternatives for
the passive removal of decay heat, it is evident that the pebble fuel has a unique possibility which 
the other major fuel forms (pin and block/plate) would have difficulty to emulate.  In addition to 
heat transfer, there is the possibility of mass transfer.  Below is a summary of the potential
passive decay heat removal mechanisms.
  1. Mass Transfer
   - Fuel dump system
  2. Heat Transfer
   - Radiation/conduction cooldown
x vessel boundary 
x core/internal heat sinks (cooled/uncooled) 
x primary system heat sinks (cooled/uncooled) 
 - Natural convection
x vessel boundary 
x core internal heat sinks (cooled/uncooled)
x primary system heat sinks (cooled/uncooled) 
- Special devices
x heat pipe
x cold finger 
  3. Inertia
- increasing fuel form thermal inertia 
   - increasing flow coastdown times
4.3.1 Mass Transfer 
In the case of the mass transfer option, the idea would be to remove fuel rapidly from the core 
perhaps even outside the primary system, where alternative means of cooling without the need
for active systems can be utilized to prevent fuel damage.  Advocates of the pebble bed thermal
gas cooled reactor have continued to stress the ease of fueling and defueling the reactor with this
particular spherical fuel form.  Continuous on-line refueling with this option is taken to be the 
norm for the PBMR.  This particular characteristic for steady state operation could also be 
possibly used to advantage under accident situations.  Removal of the fuel pebbles from the core 
within the time scale of the accident to system locations where the conditions are more amenable
to control is an attractive option.  Pebble evacuation systems or bed dump systems need to be 
designed for the depressurization accident with the total loss of electric power such that the 
decay heat will not degrade the pebble significantly during the transient and the final pebble 
collection area needs to have passively coolable and subcritical geometry.
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4.3.2 Boundary Conduction/Radiation Cooldown and Thermal Inertia 
The radiation and conduction heat transfer modes are a different case from mass transfer.  Pebble 
beds have both radiation and conduction heat transfer with radiation being the more important.
The spherical form in packed beds is a good form for radiation as there are radiation pathways to 
the exterior boundary from within the interior of the bed.  Complete shadowing is very difficult 
to achieve in this geometry for the range of pebble sizes of interest.  But ultimately there needs to 
be a heat sink.  In the case of the thermal gas cooled reactor, heat radiation/conduction core 
generated decay heat to the vessel boundary (“conduction cooldown mode”) has been a major
part of the safety case.  This is both for the prismatic fuel design as well as for the pebble/bed
fuel design.  Conceptually, this is also therefore a heat sink/decay heat pathway for the pebble 
bed fast gas cooled reactor.  But as noted previously, there is a major difference between the 
power density of a thermal gas cooled reactor and the power density of a GFR.
Conduction/radiation of the core decay heat to the vessel wall boundary is a function of power 
density, material properties and geometry.  If conduction cooldown is not possible due to too 
large a target power density or geometrical constraints on surface-to-volume ratio, then 
distributed core internal heat sinks would be a potential alternative.  For the pin-based reactor 
there is no conduction component to this pathway unless some type of a web type spacer design 
is envisioned but that would increase the steady-state coolant pressure drop through the core.
Furthermore unless there are “few fat pins” as opposed to “many thin pins” there will be a large 
number of radiation interface between the center of the core and the vessel boundary.  This could 
lead to large temperature drops.  In the case of the block core, the radiation interfaces are the 
gaps between the blocks.  These clearances are necessary for the mechanics of refueling.  Larger 
blocks could help the passive conduction of heat to the boundary but the weight would increase 
the requirements on the refueling machines.  Interblock gaps are a necessity.  High conductivity 
block matrix material would be advantageous to this mode of passive decay heat removal.  High 
thermal inertia block matrix material would also be advantageous.  Both these attributes would 
be useful for the pebble matrix material and the fuel pin pellets.  Though in the case of the pellet, 
typically the decay heat level is low enough that it is the radiation temperature drops between the 
pins that dominate.  In addition to material properties, geometry matters.  In particular the 
surface-to-volume is the important parameter.  This affects the aspect ratio of the core and 
ultimately of the primary vessel.  The PBMR and the GT-MHTGR thermal reactors are both tall 
thin reactors to promote the conduction of the core decay heat to the vessel boundary and thereby 
the conduction cooldown off the vessel wall.  This geometry however also promotes neutron 
leakage from the core and impacts the neutron balance adversely.  For a fast reactor where the
neutron leakage is typically much larger than the thermal reactor, this would unfortunately be a 
large effect. 
4.3.3 In-Core Heat Sinks 
Given the unfavorable trends it is still possible to consider conduction cooldown as a potential 
passive decay heat removal mechanism if the ultimate heat sink is not the vessel boundary but a 
series of distributed core internal heat sinks.  These heat sinks could be uncooled thermal inertia 
sinks or cooled through secondary natural convection pathways.  For the uncooled option it can 
be seen from Figure 3 and the discussion, that a significant amount of thermal capacity could be 
17
required to absorb the excess heat until the decay heat production decays to the heat removal rate 
possible through the vessel boundary.  For the cooled options, the passive heat removal in these 
internal core heat sink locations could be natural convection cooled heat exchangers or special 
devices such as heat pipes.  In all cases the cooled option requires the provision of connections 
through the primary system boundary to the ultimate external heat sink.  There is also the use of 
the vessel wall as an intermediate heat sink with external cooling of the wall.  However even in 
this case, the same difficulty exists of connecting all these internal core heat sinks to the ultimate
heat sink.  A complex piping system for this internal heat transport problem within the vessel 
may have to be designed.  This system would have to be accommodated by control rod drives 
internals and the refueling mode of operation.  Failure of this system should not depressurize the 
primary coolant system otherwise it would not meet the single failure criteria.  The choice of 
coolant on the secondary side is also an important factor.  Moisture in the GFR core has 
historically been regarded as a positive reactivity effect and there are certainly combinations of 
fuel materials and coolant selection that should be avoided for compatibility reasons.  As far as 
conduction/radiation of the core generated decay heat to those in-core locations the same
phenomena governing the conduction/radiation cooldown to the vessel wall would govern here.
The pin core with its multiple radiation interfaces would be at a disadvantage.  The gaps in the 
block core could be minimized depending upon design.  The pebble bed core could have 
challenging temperature conditions for the heatsink boundary material as contact would be made
with the pebbles.
4.3.4 Natural Convection 
Just a mass transfer is acknowledged as a special feature of the pebble bed fuel form and 
configuration, it is also acknowledged that in general the pebble bed form is not the optimum
form for natural convection.  The pressure drops inherent to the pebble bed configuration are not 
conducive for natural circulation.  There is certainly more flexibility in the design of other fuel 
element forms to optimize for natural convection.  However, even if pin based or block plate 
based cores are selected for the natural convection heat transfer mode, helium is a poor heat 
transfer medium at one atmosphere pressure.  The level of the acceptable accident pressure 
whether a separate heavy gas injection needs to be arranged, and the means to maintaining a 
residual backpressure are all design questions that need to be resolved.  The question of the 
residual backpressure required to maintain an acceptable level of natural convection to transport
the decay heat away from the core is tied closely to the selection of the coolant gas.  The light 
gas helium is acknowledged to be a natural convection medium that requires very tall chimneys
and large elevation heads.  Heavy gases such as CO2 are acknowledged to be better.  A lower 
backpressure is required for the same heat removal rates.   Conversely shorter chimneys can be 
used.  However, since helium has been selected as the primary coolant, heavy gas injection into 
the primary system would be required to replace the helium with the heavy gas.  The issue of 
mixing, bypass and timescale all need to be addressed.  Furthermore fuels such as carbides are 
chemically reactive with gases such are CO2.  The list of economic possibilities is limited.
Presuming that an appropriate gas for the natural convection mode has been selected, a heat sink
needs to be provided to couple to the core.  Heat sinks external to the primary system would 
require a guaranteed convection path through the primary boundary during depressurization 
accidents.  Quick opening valves in the boundary would be required.  This would have the 
drawback of being a potential system depressurization initiation.  There are certainly inherent
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heat sinks such as shield/reflector regions, upper internals and the vessel metal, but unless 
provision is made for passive cooling of the vessel wall, there would be need for a dedicated 
emergency heat exchanger that is designed for natural convection cooling on the secondary side.
Credit should be taken for the inherent heat sinks, both thermal inertia and natural convection 
cooling off the vessel walls in the cavity/silo as the phenomena will occur.  But confirmation of
this type of heat loss mechanism would require substantial CFD analyses and experimental
confirmation of natural convection cell patterns. Maintenance of a backup pressure during 
primary system break/leak induced depressurization events would require a secondary guard 
containment or vessel surrounding the preliminary boundary.  The challenge in designing and 
building this guard containment would depend upon the backup pressure level selected and the 
layout of the primary system and balance-of-plant.  The questions of direct vs. indirect cycle, 
hydrogen production vs. electricity generation and others such as these would do have a large 
impact on the design of the guard containment.
4.3.5 Flow Inertia/Semi-Passive Systems 
In the section on the discussion of conduction/radiation to internal cooled core heat sinks (heat 
pipes/cold fingers) the role of accumulators was briefly mentioned.  Accumulators have been 
proposed in the NERI/I-NERI projects to handle the early decay heat transient (3%-6% power).
There is an essential difference between the use of accumulators proposed for the GFR and LWR
accumulators.  The function of accumulators in LWRs is to keep the core covered and cooled 
through reflood, refill and rewet. Essentially, it is the water mass inventory that is important to 
the boil off.  This is not the case here.  The role of the accumulator here is to produce a residual
coolant flow through the core to maintain cooling.  This is basically the hydraulic equivalent of 
the pump motor flywheel to build on flow inertia and produce a longer coastdown.  A flow, 
however small, of the order of few% is sufficient.  This can be maintained by a low power 
circulator (couple hundred kilowatts) as mentioned in the NERI/I-NERI projects [4,5].  However 
this would be considered an active system in PRA space.  It has moving parts and requires a 
power source.  An accumulator with a rupture disc for instance may be considered to be semi-
passive or passive depending upon the regulatory authority. 
But the I-NERI project [6] has shown a considerable storage capacity even at cryogenic
conditions would be required. Moreover there is the potential issue of ECCS bypass.  Depending 
upon break location and size, accumulator injected flow may bypass the core and proceed
directly to discharge through the break.  One novel possibility of solving the bypass problem for 
the GFR is to design for a ductless pin-based core and inject directly into the core at key
locations internal to the core.  The means for delivery would be the control rod system.  In the 
case of the Browns Ferry fire, the TVA BWR, a core melt accident was prevented by injection 
control rod leakage flow through the rod hydraulic system and directly into the core to augment
the core coolant inventory.  The I-NERI GFR design is proceeding along the lines of a bottom
entry pneumatic driven control rod drive system.  There is therefore the possibility of utilizing 
this drive system as a dual function reactivity control system and a passive decay heat removal
system for heavy gas injection. This concept is not likely to be feasible in block/plate or pebble 
based cores.  The best option would be a ductless pin-based core similar to the PWR. 
But this concept may not be the most efficient use of the compressed gas in the accumulator.  It 
could be more efficient to use the compressed gas to drive an auxiliary circulator.  Very low core 
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flow, once the initial decay heat transient has been mitigated, is needed to remove the residual
decay heat.  In addition if an indirect power cycle reactor plant is used, the secondary side could 
be S- CO2, which would be a significant inventory of compressed gas.  This would be an advantage 
of selecting an indirect cycle plant over the direct cycle one.  Further extrapolation of this semi-
passive/semi-active approach would lead to autonomous systems where the reactor decay heat 
power could be used to drive an auxiliary circulator through an emergency heat engine system.
These concepts would require a PRA assessment to confirm the reliability of the approach.
There would be a need for active elements.  An active circulator would drive the core flow.  The 
heat engine would be an active component.  To return to a more passive approach the possibility 
of utilizing a gas-gas ejector could be considered.  This could be similar to the BWR jet pump
that is a liquid-liquid ejector.
4.4 Evaluations 
The thermal gas cooled reactor development work of the last twenty years for both the HTGR 
and PBMR types have set the boundary of the safety case for decay heat removal accidents.  For 
protected depressurization events with combined total loss of electric power, passive decay
removal mechanisms can prevent core melting conditions even though fuel failure is anticipated 
in the case of break areas of less than 100 sq. inches.  Comparable safety cases have also been 
developed in the last twenty years for fast reactors using the sodium coolant option.  The NERI 
and I-NERI GFR project supported by DOE has explored the possibility of achieving a similar
safety case for the GFR.  Additional calculations performed during the initial phase of this Gen 
IV project have produced complementary information.  The main focus of these efforts has been 
on the effect of core fuel form and configuration on the feasibility of these passive decay heat 
removal mechanism for the GFR.  The major alternatives for fuel forms are: 
1 Metal clad pins with fuel pellets.
2 Block or plates with dispersion or coated particle fuel
The DOE supported NERI project, [2,5] and I-NERI project [3,8] have produced results for a 
small modular pebble bed GFR (300 MWt), and a larger modular reactor (600 MWt) with either 
a pin-type or block-type GFR core design.  Additional RELAP5/ATHENA simulations have 
been performed in the Gen IV effort for a 600 MWt pebble bed design GFR to augment the 
NERI and I-NERI evaluations.  Based on the sum total of these lessons learned, a number of 
conclusions can be drawn for each of the potential mechanisms identified in Table 1. 
4.4.1 Mass Transfer 
The removal of the pebble fuel out off a pebble bed core during an accident by the dump system
to a passively coolable location has been divided by the NERI/I-NERI projects into two stages 
(1) initial transport of the pebbles to the collection tanks (2) the controlled cooldown of the 
collection tanks.  The I-NERI project work [6] has concluded that for a reasonable power density 
range of 50 W/cc the time scale needed for transporting the pebble is on the order of tens of 
seconds, which is very much shorter than that for the thermal reactor system that is on the order 
of hours.  Work still needs to be done on the design of the transport ducts in particular, the 
temperature response of the structures but given the smaller number of pebbles and the potential 
velocities achievable, the transport of the pebbles may be feasible. A larger issue is the design of
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the collection tanks.  There may need to be a large number of tanks (tens) with limited
dimensions restricted by both criticality criteria and passive conduction/radiation heat transfer 
criteria on heat removal to the tank boundary.  Sacrificial collector material may need to be used.
The NERI project [5] has shown that if water boiling is allowed then a natural convection preflux 
condensation system could be designed with a reasonable size cooling tower.  However, if 
borated water is needed for reactivity control, then the issue of the boundary passive cooling will 
have to be re-evaluated.  Those conclusions are supported by the following summary of the 
various analyses performed to date.  Figure 10 shows previous German work on a pebble dump
system for the German pebble bed reactor designs.  A GFR pebble bed during system would be 
similar but the manual dump would be replaced with a temperature sensitive or pressure sensitive
dump valve.  Figure 11 show the typical timescale for the adiabatic heat up of the pebbles in a 
50w/cc pebble-bed core.  The results show that about a minute is available before fuel damage
becomes of concern.  Table 2 show results based on velocity correlations presented in the 
German work for core dump times for a range of parameter values.  It appears that a 50-60 cm
bottom orifice would be needed to dump the entire core within the one-minute thermal time
scale.  Given that the pebble bed core diameter is ~3 meter, this size bottom orifice may be 
feasible and the I-NERI project is continuing to investigate the engineering design issues. 
Figure 10.  Longitudinal Section through Core Evacuation System [6] 
1. Hot air outlet ducts (cooling system)
2. Pebble evacuation duct 
3. Cold air inlet duct (cooling system)
4. Pebble management area 
5. Catch/distribution funnel 
6. Guide vane 
7. Fire brick insulation
8. Access cover
9. Foundation 
10. Hot air plenum
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11. Fire brick wall 
12a. Maximum height of pebble bed (2 filled locations)
12b. Maximum height of pebble bed (3 filled locations) 
13. Pebble bed 
14. Cast iron pebble bed 
15. Floor and insulation 
16. Inlet frit
17. Inlet air plenum and distributor 
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Figure 11.  Variation of Fuel Temperature with Time in 5-cm Pebbles – No Gas Accumulator.
[6]
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Table 2.  Core Evacuation Time for Representative Pebble Densities and Sizes [6] 
Orifice diameter
(cm)
Pebble diameter
(cm)
Pebble density 
(gm/cc) D/d
Evacuation time
(s)
60 3 6.5 20 27.6
50 3 6.5 17 46.5
40 3 6.5 13 88.2
20 3 6.5 6.5 681.2
60 3.5 6.8 17 29.1
50 3.5 6.8 14 49.1
40 3.5 6.8 11 93.8
20 3.5 6.8 5.5 735.5
60 4.0 7.1 15 30.6
50 4.0 7.1 12.5 51.8
40 4.0 7.1 10 99.2
20 4.0 7.1 5 817.0
Pebble bed concept long-term decay heat removal
In view of the above conclusions this work has concentrated on ultimate safe storage
configurations of the pebbles, which have to satisfy the following two requirements:
1) The configuration must be sub-critical assuming fresh fuel (presumably the most
reactive). A value of the multiplication factor of 0.95 will be assumed to be sufficiently
sub-critical.
2) The decay heat remaining in the fuel pebbles must be conducted out of the storage 
configuration and into a long-term heat removal system. The maximum temperature of 
the pebbles must be below the maximum allowed accident temperature (~ 1600º C) 
Both the above two requirements are more difficult to meet for gas cooled fast reactor fuel than 
for the gas cooled thermal reactor concept for which this concept was developed. The pebble 
fissile loading in the case of the fast reactor is significantly higher than for the thermal reactor,
and thus the possibility of creating a critical assembly in the storage bins is a lot higher for the 
fast reactor fuel. Since the operating power density in the case of the fast reactor is much higher 
than in the thermal reactor concept, the decay heat is proportionately higher, and thus the long-
term heat removal by conduction through the pebble bed and natural convection using air is not 
practical.
Temperature history estimates of pebble fuel following a depressurization accident were made
using the RELAP code, which included the PCU volume, and a realistic break area of 100 in2.
The pebble temperature as a function of time following the start of the accident is shown on 
Figure 12. It is seen that initially the temperature drops to a minimum of ~ 670º C after ~ 200 s, 
and then increases adiabatically for ~ 1000 s before it reaches the unacceptable limit. Thus, it is 
necessary that any self-sustaining scheme for removing the decay heat startup and reach steady 
state operation in 1000 s. In the current case this implies that the core evacuation and transition 
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to long-term heat removal take place in this time frame. The core evacuation will take place in 90 
s – 120 s, thus ~ 800 s are available to transition to steady state heat removal. In view of the 
above heat removal limitations, a scheme is proposed in which the eventual configuration of the 
pebbles consists of a randomly packed bed infiltrated by a suitable eutectic. The eutectic must
have a density below that of the pebbles (in order that the pebbles sink into the molten eutectic),
a sufficiently high thermal conductivity to remove the decay heat to the container surface, a 
melting point temperature well below the unacceptable limit, and a boiling point above the 
unacceptable temperature limit. Several candidate eutectics exist that satisfy at least two of the 
above criteria, but only an aluminum-magnesium (Al-Mg) alloy (equally mixed) satisfies all the 
conditions. It has a density of ~ 2.7 gm/cc (well below the pebble density), melting point (~ 450º
C), a boiling point above 2000º C, and high conductivity (~ 100 W/m-K). Assuming that the 
initial pebble temperature contacting the surface of the eutectic is 670º C, and progressively
higher temperatures, it was assumed that the process at the interface between the particles and 
the solid eutectic is similar to that of ablation, in that the melt phase is removed from the surface 
as it forms. In the ablation case this process is clear, and in the current case the molten material is 
assumed to infiltrates into the spaces between the pebbles behind the layer in contact with the
solid eutectic. Thus fresh eutectic is continually melted and flows up into the pebble bed. The 
molten eutectic is the primary heat removal medium to the container walls. It can be shown that 
the rate of melt front progression is proportional to the heat flux, and inversely proportional to 
the density, heat of fusion, and the heat required to raise the solid eutectic to the melt
temperature. Preliminary estimates of the melt front progresses at 1.0 mm/s – 2.5 mm/s,
depending on assumptions made regarding the initial eutectic temperature, and the heat flux. At 
this rate a column of pebbles 50 cm high would sink into the eutectic in ~ 500 s or less. This 
value is well within the time limit discussed above, and should ensure that it is possible to cover 
the pebbles with an appropriate molten eutectic before the unacceptably high temperatures are 
reached.  Assuming that the columns are 50 cm high and have a radius of 20 cm, it would be 
necessary to divide the initial core volume into 96 cylindrical containers. These containers are 
arranged in a hexagonal lattice with a pitch of 45 cm. The containers are made of borated 
stainless steel with a wall thickness of 0.5 cm. The spaces between the containers is assumed to 
be filled with light water, which is assumed to be boiling in the steady state long-term heat 
removal phase. 
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Figure 12. Pebble fuel temperature as a function of time following a depressurization accident
Preliminary estimates of the multiplication factor using the MCNP Monte Carlo code and both 
the CEA and ANL TRU fissile material vectors indicated that in both cases the initial 
configuration would indeed be super-critical. Thus boron was added to the stainless steel wall to 
de-couple the water from the fissile material in the pebbles. The boron was assumed to be natural 
boron, and ~ 8000 appm are necessary to ensure that the multiplication factor is below the target 
value of 0.95. Finally, assuming that the heat transfer at the container surface is by boiling then 
the maximum centerline temperature of the pebble-eutectic mixture is ~ 800º C, and the inner 
surface temperature of the container is ~ 350º C. This is a modest operating temperature for 
stainless steel, and it should be able to withstand any imposed mechanical and pressure induced 
loads.
4.4.2 Conduction/Radiation Cooldown to Boundary and Thermal Inertia 
The major design parameter for accommodating decay heat passively for all three fuel types is 
core fuel power density.  Certainly major fuel power derating from the traditional GCFR values 
of 250w/cc from 25 years ago would be a major positive factor in improving the feasibility of the 
proposed passive decay heat removal mechanisms. However for all these fuel forms, current fuel 
cycle economic factors for a uranium startup core would set a minimum power density range on 
the order of 70-100 w/c3.  This is still a major reduction from the historical range.  With core fuel 
power density of 70-100 w/c3, the thermal gas reactor “conduction cooldown” mode of passive 
heat transfer of core generated heat through conduction and/or radiation inter and intra fuel 
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elements to the vessel boundary is not possible for the GFR.  This is irregardless of fuel form,
block/plate, pin or pebble.  With the limited conductivity of the potential core fuel and structural 
materials, even 1 to 2% decay heat would lead to core disruption conditions.  With the high 
temperature requirements of the Gen IV GFR (~850 $  coolant outlet) and the fuel flux/fluence 
conditions the set of potential materials is small.  However, even if graphite with its neutron 
spectrum softening disadvantage, utilized in the thermal gas reactor cores was used, success 
would not be attained.  The crux of the matter is the low (~ 5w/cc) power density of the thermal
gas reactor.  To lower the density of the fuel by adding diluents, equation (2) shows that it could 
lower the power density and still retain the high specific power requirements.  This would also 
be attractive from the viewpoint of adding thermal inertia.  However a fast reactor core requires 
significantly higher fuel densities/loading to maintain criticality over a high burnup fuel cycle (~ 
30% volume function of 10 gm/cc ceramic fuel with 20% fissile).  Moreover the thermal
properties of potential diluents are in the same range of the fuel. Adding diluents is not a 
potential solution for the GFR given the state of future core material development work.  Adding 
thermal inertia to absorb decay power in sensible heat until ~0.1% decay power is reached, is not 
feasible.
C
Evaluation
Those conclusions are supported by the following summary of the various analyses performed to 
date.  Figure 13 shows that the steady state thermal conduction solution for a two dimensional
cylinder with uniform heat generation and constant temperature boundary condition, can be 
correlated as a non-dimensional grouping. 
P f ( )
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D (4)
where:
P = power
D =diameter
N  = conductivity 
"  = length 
T'  = temperature rise 
Figure 13 is a numerical fit of the analytical series solution provided in [2].
Asymptotically as D o
"
O  the solution approaches that for a thin rod while in the other limit
D of
"
 it approaches that for a thin plate.  Figure 13 can be translated into Figure 14 where core 
length (height) is plotted as a function of aspect ratio for a given  value [3].  Table 3 shows a 
range of  values of interest for a 600 MWt reactor core. 
Șl
Șl
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Table 3.  Values of Șl
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Figure 13.  Two-Dimensional Solution for a Cylinder with a Uniform Heat Generation Rate and 
Constant Temperature Boundary Conditions.  [2]
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The values are tabulated as a function of the temperature rise through the cylindrical core for two 
values of conductivity.  The conductivity of stainless steel is ~ 15w/m  while that of copper is 
~300 w/m .  The core materials currently being considered for the GFR have conductivities in 
the range 15-30 w/m . It can be seen from Figure 14 that for 200 <
C$
C$
C$ K" <800 and for historical 
fast reactor aspect ratio of ~ 1 (0.5 to 2.0) core dimensions are large (5 to 10 meters).  This 
would translate to power densities of ~ ʜw/cc which is very much smaller than the GCFR value 
of 25 years ago of ~250w/cc.  To achieve these historical values of power densities would 
require some very skewed core shapes with aspect ratios at the extremes (0.1 or 10).  This would 
lead to very large neutron flux leakage and very short burnup cycles or very large fissile content.
Furthermore the limiting temperature on materials could be particle coating integrity limits on 
the order of 1600 $  and there are additional temperature drops (mostly radiative drops) between
the core edges and the vessel wall.  Unless substantially higher conductivity core materials can 
be developed, passive removal of decay heat (> 1% nominal power) through pure conduction
cooldown alone to the vessel boundary will not feasible for economic operations of the GFR.
This is not a thermal gas cooled reactor where, as discussed previously, a power density of 5 
W/cc is economically acceptable.
C
But conduction alone is not the sole mechanism for transporting core decay heat to the wall 
boundary through the fuel elements.  For fuel forms such as the pin or the pebble, as opposed to 
monolithic blocks, radiation heat transfer is a major component of the fuel element-to-fuel
element heat transfer.  To compare the relative effectiveness of conductivity relative to radiation 
in transferring heat from fuel element to fuel element to the vessel wall boundary, reference 
should be made to Tables 4-5 and Figures 15-16 [2].  A single fuel pin (0.285” diameter) and 
rated at 6kw/ft as from 25 years ago, is placed at the center of a 26ft diameter cylinder.  The 
Tables and Figures show the temperature rise from the boundary to the pin for a solid opaque 
cylinder (conduction) and for a transparent material with zero conductivity (radiation).  Clearly 
materials with the conductivity of copper are far superior, but even with the conductivity of steel 
it is not until the temperature range is between 1000 - 1200 C that radiation heat transfer 
becomes better than conduction heat transfer.  Furthermore, in the case of radiation heat transfer, 
the central fuel pins are shadowed from the vessel wall boundary by many other rows of fuel 
pins.  The NERI project [3] has shown that for the GCFR fuel bundle design of 25 years ago 
(250w/cc) with a hexagonal assembly of 271 ceramic fuel pins configured into ten rows, even at 
a decay heat level 0.33% of rated power there is a temperature difference of 1200˚C between the 
center pin (2050˚C) and the hex duct (316 ).
$
C$
Table 6 shows the effective pin bundle conductivity for fuel pin conductivities changed to those 
of steel (15w/ m ).  It can be seen that ten rows of pins with the corresponding radiation 
interfaces is very challenging for radiative heat transfer.  Even if the hex assemblies were made
of solid block fuel there would still be radiation interfaces due to the clearances gaps between the 
blocks designed for refueling.  For the GCFR assembly design of 25 years ago, Table 7 shows 
results [3] for a 50w/cc core rated at 600 MWt.  This translates to 13 rows of 469 block-type fuel 
assemblies radiating heat through the gaps between the blocks made with infinite conductivity 
material to the vessel, which is held at 316˚C.  This shows that even with perfectly conducting 
block fuel, the fuel clearance gaps will make it very difficult to conduct/radiate decay heat 
through the fuel elements to the vessel wall boundary without damaging the fuel. 
C$
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Table 4.  Temperature Rise for Radiant Heat Transfer [2] 
Temperature
of Enclosure 
Surface, C 
Temperature
Rise for 
60 W/ft 
Temperature
Rise for 
30 W/ft 
316 (600 F) 133.9 76.9
400 100.4 55.4
600 52.5 27.4
800 29.6 15.1
1000 18.1 9.1
1200 11.8 5.9
1400 8.1 4.1
2800 1.31 0.65
Table 5.  Temperature Rise for Conductive Heat Transfer [2] 
Thermal
Conductivity,
W/m-K
Temperature
Rise for 
60 W/ft 
Temperature
Rise for 
30 W/ft 
15 14.6 7.3
300 0.731 0.366
Table 6.  Pin Bundle Effective Conductivity 
Boundary T C$ k w/m-c
316 2.07
1600 7.54
2000 9.86
Table 7:   Block Core with Gaps Peak Fuel Temperature
% Decay Power Fuel T peak C$
2.5 2955
5.0 3594
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Table 8.  Thermal Properties of Candidate Pebble Materials [5] 
Material Thermal
Conductivity
at 1000
W/m-K
C$
Density,
kg/m3
ȡ
Specific heat 
capacity at 
1500 ,C$
J/kg-K (Cp)
Product of 
ȡ x Cp,
J/m3-k x 
10-6
Melting Point 
or Dissociation 
Temperature, C 
Silicon Carbide 35.7 3160 1336 4.22 ~2000
Titanium
Nitride
22 6400 595 3.81 3230
Zirconium
Carbide
22 6510 250 1.63 3530
Uranium Oxide 3.6/3.2 10960/9660 339 3.72/3.27 2730 (2805) 
Uranium
Carbide
20/17.5 13630/12970 272 3.71/3.53 2400 (2525)
Uranium
Nitride
24.6 14320/13510 272 3.90/3.67 2600 (2850)
Graphite ~30 1700 ~2000 3.4 3650
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Figure 15.  Radiation Versus Conduction for a Pin Power of 60 W/ft. (The lower dashed curve 
corresponds to conduction at 300 W/m-K.). [2] 
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Figure 16.  Radiation Versus Conduction for a Pin Power of 30 W/ft.  (The lower dashed curve 
corresponds to conduction at 300 W/m-K. [2] 
As discussed previously, the possibility exists to absorb excess decay heat by increasing the core 
thermal inertia, stretch out the time scale and reach a lower decay heat level before the
conduction cooldown phase with boundary heat losses is required.  Table 8 shows the thermal
properties of candidate GFR core material being considered.  It can be seen that the volumetric
heat capacity, which is important to the thermal criteria, is largely in the range of 3-4 j/m3-K.
While there are variations, there is no quantum improvement.  However, even in the case of the 
thermal conductivity the value is principally in the range 20-30 w/m˚K, with the exception of
uranium oxide fuel, replacing fuel with matrix material can lead to improvements but it is not a 
quantum one.  Table 9 shows the results for a series of one-dimensional transient conduction
calculations performed for the one-dimensional slice through a reactor, which is shown in Figure 
17 [3,5].  This is a pebble-bed core reactor. Table 10 shows follow-on calculations [5].  The 
pebble design is a two region (tootsie-pop) pebble when the inner region is an unfueled region.
This decreases the temperature peaking in the pebble and leads to the possibility of using 
different thermal inertia material in the center of the pebble and perhaps also taking credit for the 
latent heat of the inner region.  For the results presented in Table 9, both inner and outer region 
material utilize the properties of steel.  Furthermore, in another effort to boost heat capacity, a 
number of the calculation in Table 9 are for an annular core design where the central core region
is filled with unfueled pebbles.  This once again is an effort to increase the thermal inertia.  The 
reactor vessel boundary condition is both radiation and convection to an environment at 149˚C
(300˚F).  Table 9 shows that even for a small reactor of 300 MWt power, it would be difficult to 
meet a fuel temperature criteria of 1600˚C for power densities greater then 15w/cc.  In the 
follow-on cases shown on Table 10, all the cases are variations on case 19 where the only change 
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is the choice of pebble material. It can be seen that the candidate list of materials from Table 8 
does not lead to a quantum improvement.  This evaluation of the NERI/I-NERI project results
provides the basis for the conclusion stated at the beginning of the section.  In summary for the 
range of GFR power densities, conduction/radiation cooldown to the vessel boundary is not the 
optimum passive decay heat removal mechanism for this reactor type.
Table 9.  One-Dimensional Cases [3] 
Case Name Inner
Radius of 
Core, m
Core
Volumetric
Heat
Generation
Rate, W/cc
300 MWt
Core
Height, m
300 MWt
Core
Pressure
Drop, psi 
Max, Core 
Transient
Temp., C 
Max.
Transient
Reactor
Vessel
Temp., C 
case 11 0 2.790 10.0 17.6 1517 372
case 13 0 5.580 5.0 8.8 1991 486
case 14 1.3081 5.580 10.0 65.5 1169 386
case 15 1.3081 11.16 5.0 32.7 1645 495
case 16 1/3081 16.74 3.3 21.8 1874 589
case 17 1.2 15.00 3.2 15.9 1982 603
case 18* 1.2 15.00 3.2 15.9 1835 615
case 19 1.4 15.00 4.4 38.4 1575 521
case 20** 1.4 15.00 4.4 38.4 1844 495 (after
initial
phase)
case 21 1.3081 15.00 2.7 17.8 1754 556
*The reflector and the neutron shielding are made of nickel instead of 304 stainless steel. 
**The region from the outer surface of the reflector to the inner surface of the reactor vessel is 
filled with unfueled pebbles through which the inlet coolant flows during normal reactor 
operation.  Also, the initial steady-state condition has been modified.
Table 10.  Additional Vessel Conduction Decay Heat Removal Cases [5] 
Case
Name
Pebble Type Core Maximum
Temperature, C 
Vessel Maximum
Temperature, C 
19 Steel (Tootsie Pop) with Latent Heat 1575 521
26 Steel (Tootsie Pop) without Latent Heat 1628 532
23 Silicon Carbide 1661 540
24 Zirconium Carbide 1774 564
22 Tungsten (with Tungsten Reflector) 1682 561
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Figure 17.  Radial Slice Through Core of Pebble-Bed Fast Reactor. [3] 
4.4.3 Core Heat Sinks 
Inertia is insufficient and for the passive heat transfer option to be successful, there is the 
possibility of heat sinks internal to the core.  These could be heat pipes or the cold finger concept
(bayonet heat exchange) introduced in the NERI/I-NERI projects [8].  Fuel forms would make a 
difference here.  Pin-based and plate-based cores can be ruled out, as there are too many 
radiation interfaces.  Block cores would be the optimum if no interblock gaps were required.
However for defueling this is not an option so pebble bed cores can be equally considered from
the viewpoint of heat transfer.  The NERI/I-NERI projects have shown that in the range 25-50 
w/cc for 1 to 2% of decay power the number density of the heat pipes/cold fingers would be 
about that of the control rod positions.  The cold fingers exploit this feature and the NERI/I-
NERI projects have proposed designs where the finger has both reactivity control and passive 
heat removal functions.  As of this date, there is no such dual design for a heat pipe.
Furthermore transport of the decay heat from the heat pipe to the ultimate heat sink requires
another fluid transport system, whereas for the cold finger a pressurized all-CO2 system has been 
proposed.  But with both concepts, refueling for the block core has to be bottom entry.  For a 
passive system the heated coolant in the heat pipes and the cold fingers rise to the top of the 
reactor core.  All the piping connections are made at the top, which makes top refueling for the 
block-based core very challenging.  However this is not the case for the pebble bed core.
Conceptually the pebble can be rolled in from the top of the reactor in to the lattice of heat 
pipes/cold fingers.  This is a major design and materials problem but in principle may be 
solvable by a long term R&D program.  This option would therefore be a high-risk/long term
research and development possibility and in the end would be still on the low end of the desired 
core power density range.  Moreover, the short term decay heat transient from ~6% to 3% power 
may require additional passive heat removal systems. The current round of RELAP5/ATHENA
calculations is inconclusive in that regard.  More detailed simulation is required of potential 
33
supplementary passive heat loss mechanisms such as conduction/radiation from the core to the 
core barrel, to the upper internal and other structures that are all potential thermal sinks.  If these 
phenomena are insufficient there may be the need for accumulators, which then leads to the 
discussion later on the balance between active and passive systems.
Evaluation
These conclusions are supported by the following summary of the various analyses performed to 
date.  Analyses have been performed of the heat-pipe option with the block core design and the 
cold finger option with the pebble bed core design.  Since similar results have been obtained with 
the heat pipe/block core combination, this summary will focus on the results obtained with the 
cold finger/pebble-bed option.  Figure 18 shows the cold finger concept [8].  Essentially the cold
finger provides two key core functions in one location; (1) reactivity control and (2) passive
decay heat removal.  Core control rods have to be provided cooling irregardless of design, so the 
concept encloses the control rod with its thimble in a separate pressure tube housing isolated 
from the main primary system core coolant flow. Within the pressure tube there is an insulator
tube that surrounds the thimble and provides the means for the control rod coolant flow with a U-
turn at the bottom.  The redirected upward flow then cools the pressure tube from the inside.
During the accident sequence the core decay heat would be conducted/radiated through the fuel 
elements towards the internal core heat sinks, the cold fingers, instead of only toward the vessel
wall boundary.  Figure 19 shows the complete configuration.  By design, the cold fingers would 
be inserted at the traditional control rod locations and connected to a natural convection
pressurized CO2 system.   The ultimate heat sink would ultimately have to be a fully passive dry
cooling power for example.  Table 11 shows design results for two types of pebble design, a 
50/50 metallic pebble and a solid graphite pebble.  The 50/50 pebble would be the tootsie pop 
design discussed in section     where half the pebble is fueled and the other half unfueled.  The 
metallic designation is merely to indicate that the thermal properties used are largely typical of
metals whereas the solid graphite pebble, which has no unfueled region, has thermal properties 
typical of graphite and the family of silicon carbides.  The Table shows that ~24 cold fingers 
would be sufficient for a 600MWt core design rated at ~50w/cc to keep fuel temperature limits
below the damage criteria of 1600˚C.  This is encouraging since typically for this size core ~24 
control rods would be needed to limit individual rod worth’s to 10 cents or less. 
However, the decay removal rate is only 1% power.  There may not be sufficient margin without
additional devices such as accumulators extended coastdown and additional credit taken for 
vessel wall heat losses and heat transfer to other primary vessel heat sinks.  More detailed 
analyses and accumulators asides, there is a materials issue which needs developmental R&D.
These in-core locations are high fast flux and high temperature regions.  Heat producing pebbles 
contact the cold finger pressure tubes and the contact temperature could be higher.  Furthermore
as the core is loaded, fuel pebbles will impinge upon these passive tubes. 
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Figure 18.  Cold Finger Design. [8] 
Figure 19.  Cold Finger Concept. [8] 
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Table 11.  Key Core and Cold Finger Parameters for the Two Design Choices [8] 
Quantity Parameter
design choice 1 2
pebble diameter, cm 5.0 4.0
pebble material/design 50/50 metallic solid graph.
core length, m 2.00 1.85
actual core diameter, m 3.00 3.12
rated reactor power, MWt 600
decay power level, % 1.00
elevation difference (chimney height), m 10
fuel region heat generation rate, W/cc 50
control rod thimble O. D., cm 5.0
carbon dioxide coolant inlet temperature, C 50
pressure tube thermal conductivity, W/m-K 15.0
number of cold fingers 24 24
insulator tube I. D., cm 18.5 20.0
insulator tube O. D., cm 19.5 21.0
pressure tube, I. D., cm 22.0 23.0
pressure tube O. D., cm 23.6 24.7
effective fuel region O. D., cm 61.2 63.6
fuel region thermal conductivity, W/m-K 10.9 11.9
cold finger carbon-dioxide flow rate, kg/s 3.58 3.10
carbon-dioxide coolant outlet temp., C 127.0 138.5
pressure tube I. D. temperature, C 336.5 340.7
pressure tube O. D. temperature, C 430.4 442.1
maximum fuel temperature, C 1560.1 1551.5
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Figure 20.  Estimated Operating Temperature Limits for Structural Alloys in Fission Reactors:
10-50 dpa. [9] 
Table 12.  Comparison of Properties of Commercial SiC-Based Fibers and Bulk SiC [10]
cg-
Nicalon
Hi-Nicalon Hi-Nicalon
type S
Dow
Sylramic
Bulk SiC
Diameter (m) 14 12-14 12 10 ----
Tensile strength (GPa) 2.0-3.0 2.8-3.4 2.6-2.7 2.8-3.4 ~0.1
Elastic modulus (GPa) 170-220 270 420 390-400 460
Density (g/cm3) 2.55 2.74 2.98-3.10 3.0-3.10 3.25
Coefficient of thermal
expansion (10-6/K)
3.2 3.5 --- 5.4 4.0
Thermal conductivity
at 20° C (W/m-K)
1.5 4 1.8 40-45 100-350
Oxygen content
(wt. %)
11.7 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.0
C/Si atomic ratio 1.31 1.39 1.05 1.0 1.0
So not only high-temperature and high fast-flux resistant materials will have to be utilized but 
also with high mechanical impingement structural resistance.  Figure 20 shows the estimated
operating temperature limits for a set of candidate metals, an important subset of which are the
refractory metals [9].  However the refractory metals have poor neutronic properties (large 
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absorption cores section).  Table 12 shows properties of the current leading options, various 
forms of SiC [9].  In summary, the current design results show that while cold fingers are an 
option, it would be difficult to reach the power density range of 100 w/cc without additional
passive safety mechanisms and there will be a challenging materials development effort.
4.4.4 Natural Convection 
Conduction and radiation aside, the third possible heat transfer mode is convection which in the 
passive form is natural convection.  It has historically been known that gas coolant provides a 
poor heat transfer medium with low thermal inertia at low pressure (~ 1 atmosphere) but 
historically it has been shown by design calculation that even for the historical high power 
density cores (~250w/cc) natural convection can successfully remove core decay heat at 
pressurized conditions (70 bar) for acceptable primary system elevation differences.  Even the 
short-term decay transient from 6% - 3% power can be accommodated.  The NERI/I-NERI 
projects have shown that natural convection is best suited for the block/plate and pin fuel forms
[2,10].  The pebble-bed fuel form would be the most challenging form for this option.  Pebble 
beds have inherently high resistance to core flow, which are difficult to overcome through 
design.  It is best to focus on block/plate and pin cores for the natural convection option.  For this 
option to work, a guard confinement or double containment/vessel would be required.  The 
approach is to only permit depressurization of the primary system through design means for a 
secondary backup pressure.  The choice of the backup pressure is a major design choice.  The 
lower the pressure the worse the natural convection heat removal capability but the less
challenging the design and construction issues for the guard containment.  The current optimum
choice would be a block core design with a guard containment sized for 20 bar accident pressure. 
Evaluation
These conclusions are supported by the following summary of the various analyses performed to 
date.  The analyses have been a combination of steady state primary system calculations and 
RELAP-5/ATHENA primary system transient calculations performed by the Gen IV effort.
Figure 21 shows the natural convection loop model of the primary systems used to provide the 
steady state results included here.  The core, chimney, emergency heat exchanger (EHX) and 
cold leg hydraulic losses are explicitly represented in the primary system simulation.  But, since 
the secondary side of the EHX is not modeling the EHX primary coolant outlet temperature is 
fixed.  Based on a secondary-side pressurized CO2 cooled natural convection loop and other 
design calculations [4] the EHX coolant outlet temperature is fixed at 250˚C.  It should be noted 
that the EHX tube designs were also taken from [4] for each simulation case.  Figures 22-24 
show the effects of primary system coolant choice, core outlet temperatures and decay power 
level on the primary coolant pressure required to maintain the steady state core heat removal
capability.  Results are shown for a core design of each of the three major potential fuel forms,
pebbles, pins and blocks.  The block-core design is for the reference 600 MWt reactor proposed
by CEA [7] on the I-NERI project.  It has been optimized for both 100% steady conditions as 
well as for natural convection accident conditions.  The power density is rated at ~100w/cc.  The 
block coolant channel sizes have been optimized for fabrication specifications.  Any larger 
coolant volume fractions would probably lead to a plate-type core instead of a block-type core.
Figure 22 is evidence that CO2 leads to lower secondary (guard) containment pressure 
requirements than Helium.  Even at 3% decay power, the 5-7 bars are within current PWR
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containment technology.  However, if heavy gas injection and mixing is an issue, then in the 
worst case Helium at 900˚C, a guard containment pressure of ~25 bars is required.  This pressure 
level is probably better accommodated by PCRV technology.  900˚C is probably still acceptable 
for structural temperature whereas 1100˚C is definitely not.  Figure 23 shows the corresponding 
results for the pin-core design also at 100w/cc. This pin core is the back-up design proposed by 
CEA [7] for the 600MWt reactor.  As with the block core it has been optimized for both the 
100% steady conditions and the natural convection accident conditions.  The resulting guard 
containment pressure required for the natural convection removal of the decay heat are quite 
comparable between the two core designs.  Once again CO2 is definitely better.  Figure 24 shows 
the results for the pebble core design [8].  Given the essentially dictated pebble packing fraction 
of 40% coolant volume, the flexibility to optimize the pebble bed core for natural convection is 
limited.  The results shown in the figure are for a 600MWt core rated at 50 w/cc and optimized
by the I-NERI project.  The results show that this pebble-bed core is definitely the worst
performer in terms of the required guard containment fission.  A pressure of 50 bars is required 
for Helium at 900˚C.
Figure 21.  Natural Convection Loop 
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Since these results are all for steady state conditions a set of RELAP-5/ATHENA transient 
calculations were performed for the pebble bed core design using the plant nodalization model
shown in Figure 25.  This is a scoping type model and focuses on the natural convection loop 
between the core and the EHX.  Since the PCU is only significant as an inventory of gas, it is 
modeled as two volumes.  The turbo-machinery flow coastdown is a boundary condition forced 
by the source/sink volumes.  As with the steady state analyses the EHX secondary side is not 
modeled in detail.  However, the transient heat flux and thermal inertia of the EHX tubes are 
included.  The temperature boundary condition is set on the CO2 side of the EHX.  Two sets of 
parametrics on the final guard containment pressure have been performed.  In both sets, the turbo 
machinery coastdown flow is stepped down to zero instantaneously upon the reactor scram and 
the EHX boundary temperature is set at 300˚C.  The RELAP-5 calculations had a peaking factor 
of 1.3.  In the first set the EHX length is set at 0.25 meters and in the second set the EHX length 
is set at 1 meter.  Figures 26-29 show the fuel temperature at two locations, the fourth core node 
and the fifth core node of a five node core.  The peak fuel temperature moves from the fourth 
core node to the fifth core node as the transient proceeds.  The fifth core node is located at the
core outlet.  Figures 26-27 are for the EHX lengths of 0.25m. The figures show that the fuel 
temperature damage criteria of 1600˚C is closely exceeded by the 20 bar final guard containment
pressure design while the 45 bar final pressure results have significant margin.  Figures 28-29 are 
for the EHX length of 1 meter.  These results show that for the 20 bar final guard containment
pressure the fuel temperatures widely exceed the 1600˚C fuel temperature criteria while the 45 
bar final pressure results do not.  In summary these results show that the current optimum design 
for this safety approach should be the block core design with a guard containment sized for a 
final accident pressure of ~30 bars. 
4.4.5 Flow Inertia and Semi Passive Systems 
The NERI [3] project was only funded to evaluate potential core designs and core design 
modifications which would assist in the introduction of passive decay heat removal mechanisms.
Primary design and BOP design was not considered.  Therefore, the issue of turbo machinery
and compressor/generator inertia on flow coastdown and its impact on the decay heat removal
transient was not evaluated in the NERI project.  The I-NERI project has been constructing 
CATHARE and RELAP-5/ATHENA primary system plus direct cycle BOP plant models.
However this is still at an initial stage.  The Gen IV effort at ANL is also constructing and has 
constructed a 600MWt pebble bed reactor primary system model and the details are available in 
Appendix A.  But this effort is still interacting with INEEL on RELAP-5/ATHENA
turbomachinery models.  At this stage the flow coastdown implications of the turbomachinery
inertia is still open. 
However the I-NERI effort [6] has extensively studied the potential role of accumulators on 
mitigating the effects of the selected depressurization accident sequence.  Thermal-hydraulically,
CO2 has superior performance over Nitrogen and Helium.  Inventory storage design should also 
be less challenging.  However even with cryogenic storage, ~300m3 capacity would be required 
for storage to cool the 600MWt pebble bed core down to 1.0% decay heat level.  There are 
engineering challenges on thermal stresses given the potential large difference in temperature.
Strong consideration should be given to semiactive/semipassive systems to maintain ~few% 
residual flow capability at atmospheric conditions.  In particular, autonomous systems which 
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utilize the reactor decay heat as the power source to drive circulation should be evaluated in PRA 
studies.  Compressed air driven circulators should also be considered. 
Figure 25.  RELAP-5/ATHENA Pebble Bed Reactor Model Nodalization
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Figure 26.  2.0 MPa Guard Containment Fuel Temperature for 0.25m EHX. 
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Figure 27.  4.5 MPa Guard Containment Fuel Temperatures for 0.25m EHX. 
45
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
-100 0 100 200 300 400
Time after Start of Accident, Minutes
P
ea
k 
Fu
el
 T
em
pe
ra
tu
re
s,
 C
Core 5th (Exit) Node Core 4th Node
Figure 28.  2.0 MPa Guard Containment Fuel Temperatures for 1m EHX. 
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Figure 29.  4.5 MPa Guard Containment Fuel Temperatures for 1m EHX. 
Evaluation
These conclusions are supported by the following summary of the various analyses performed to 
date.  These analyses have been performed by the I-NERI project [6].  Table 14 shows the 
relevant results.  For a measure of the time it should be noted that the decay heat time scale is 
best summarized in Table 13. 
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Table 13.  Decay Heat Timescale
Decay Heat 
%
Time
Seconds
3 200
2 700
1 4000
0.5 40000
To reach 1% decay heat would require an accumulator flow time duration of 4000 seconds.  An 
accumulator flow duration of 103 seconds would only reach 2% decay power.  Table 14 shows 
that the most promising accumulator gas from a thermal-hydraulic point of view is CO2.  But 
even with CO2, 50 volume units of CO2 would be required to reach 1% decay power.  Each 
volume unit is ~102m3.  If cryogenic storage is used this can be reduced to ~3.4 volume units of 
liquid.  The equivalent N2 cryogenic storage volume is ~2.4 volume units of liquid.  There are 
engineering design challenges particularly with respect to large temperature differences.  Figure 
30 shows the phenomena.  Essentially it is as discussed previously, a question of matching flow 
rate to the decay power history. 
Table 14:  Summary of Results Assuming Different Accumulator Gases [6] 
   Gas        Volume*     Area** Initiation Pressure+      Time to Reach 1600C 
(MPa)                (S) 
Helium 20        10 3.5   707.6 
Helium 50        10 3.5 1687.0
Helium 50        10 2.3 1687.0
Helium 50        10 1.75 1687.0
Helium 70        10 3.5 2373.0
Nitrogen 50        10 3.5 3199.0
Nitrogen 50        15 3.5 2734.0
 CO2 30               10                         3.5                               2865.0 
 CO2 50               10                         3.5                               5035.0 
 CO2 70               10                         3.5                               7343.0 
 CO2 100              10                         3.5                             11010.0 
*   Multiples of one volume unit (111 m3)
** Multiples of one area unit (1-inch diameter pipe area)
+  System pressure = 7.0 MPa 
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Figure 30.  Variation of Fuel Temperature and Decay Power with Time (Various Gases) [6] 
Work done in the NERI project on extending flow coastdown and shown in Figure 31 illustrates
this behavior.  As soon as there is a power/flow mismatch the fuel temperatures start to rise 
significantly.  Only a few percent of core residual flow is required to maintain acceptable fuel 
temperatures.  Ref. [5] showed that depending upon the range of conditions only 10-40 KW
blower power is required for one atmosphere helium to remove 2% (12MW) decay heat without
violating material damage criteria.  If a reliable enough active system can be designed this low 
power requirement is very attractive.  But the drawbacks of an active system are the probabilities 
of failure however small these may be, as opposed to a completely passive safety mechanism
where there is no probability of failure occurring.  There is an intermediate between the
completely active system and the completely passive system, a certain hybrid combination of 
semiactive/semipassive system.  An autonomous system is such a hybrid semiactive/semipassive
system.  An autonomous system would utilize the core decay heat as the power source to drive 
the low power circulator to maintain the required residual core flow rate.  A primary system heat 
exchanger would be required to transfer the decay heat to an auxiliary heat engine which would 
product the low electric power required.  The system would be on all the time and would not 
require start up or shut down.  Figures 32-34 show some possibilities. 
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Figure 31.  Dynamic Behavior Resulting from Assumed Flow and Pressure Coastdowns During a 
Depressurization Accident with Scram [5]
Figure 32 [10] shows a schematic diagram for a direct-cycle plant with an autonomous shutdown 
decay heat removal system (inside the dotted perimeter) in parallel with the main power 
conversion unit.  If the main power conversion unit (on the left side of the figure) were not 
present and all of the primary flow went to the autonomous system, the plant layout would 
essentially be that of reactor plant with an indirect cycle, i.e., there is an intermediate heat 
exchanger between the reactor and the power cycle part of the plant, or heat engine, and this heat 
engine rejects heat to the atmosphere and produces electric power, via a generator (not shown).
The autonomous system is designed to run all of the time, except when the decay power is 
extremely low.  The electricity generated by this system is separate from the main (site) power 
grid and is therefore available even when the plant becomes disconnected from the main power 
grid.
Figure 33 [10] shows a schematic diagram for an indirect-cycle plant with an autonomous decay 
heat removal system in parallel with the main power conversion unit.  The autonomous heat 
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removal system in Figure 33 is the same as the in Figure 32.  The rest of the system layout is that 
of a typical indirect cycle plant except for the check valve that is included along the main
primary flow path between the power conversion unit and the reactor. This check valve is 
needed to prevent backward flow through the main heat exchanger, i.e., the one on the left side 
of the reactor in the figure, when the power to the main primary compressor is lost and the 
autonomous system is driving coolant through the reactor core.  This bypass flow would allow 
much of the primary flow to bypass the reactor. There could be some difficulties in obtaining a 
design with the proper flow balance between the main power conversion unit loop and the 
primary flow in the autonomous loop. 
Figure 34 [10] shows a schematic diagram for an indirect-cycle plant with the main power 
conversion unit and the autonomous decay heat removal system in series in the primary loop.
This arrangement does not require any check valves.  Electric power to drive the primary flow 
comes for both the main power conversion unit and the autonomous one.  If the power from the 
main power conversion unit is lost, then electric power produced by the autonomous system
continues to maintain sufficient primary flow to remove decay heat. 
The choices for heat engines for the autonomous system are a gas turbine (Brayton cycle), a 
steam turbine (Rankine cycle), Stirling engine (Stirling cycle), solid state devices, such as 
thermal photovoltaic, thermal electric, and thermionic ones, thermosiphon rankine engine, and 
ThermoAcoustic Heat Engine (TASHE).  The choices for electric storage devices include
electric storage battery, fuel cell, and flywheel. 
Figure 32.  Direct-Cycle Layout with an Autonomous Shutdown Decay Heat Removal System
[10]
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Figure 33.  Indirect-Cycle Layout with an Autonomous Shutdown Decay Heat Removal System
in Parallel [10]
Figure 34.  Indirect-Cycle Layout with an Autonomous Shutdown Decay Heat Removal System
in Series [10] 
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In summary, the I-NERI and NERI results show the importance of providing the capability for 
some forced core residual flow of a few %.  Accumulators may not be the most efficient 
approach as compared to semi-passive/semi-active systems.  Semi-passive/semi-active systems
such as autonomous systems or compressed gas driven circulators should be further considered 
in PRA studies. 
6. Conclusions 
At this point in the development of the GFR, innovative and novel concepts have been proposed 
for introducing passive safety mechanisms into the design, attempting to provide the GFR with 
walk-away safety for decay heat removal during accidents with depressurization and total loss of 
electric power.  A significant amount of exploration work has been performed by the combined
DOE sponsored NERI, I-NERI (France – US) and Gen IV projects in the assessment and 
evaluation of these concepts.  From a technological risk viewpoint, and R&D planning, a number
of options have been identified: 1) thermal inertia, conduction, and radiation; 2) in-core heat 
exchangers; 3) forced circulation; 4) natural circulation; and 5) heavy gas injection.  Challenges 
and advantages of each are given below. 
1. While the combined effects of heat storage (thermal inertia), in-core conduction, and
vessel radiation are sufficient for thermal spectrum gas reactor decay heat removal, sole 
use of these mechanisms are not effective for decay heat removal in the GFR.  The 
exception would be the use of mass transfer in the case of the pebble bed core design, 
where the ultimate resting configuration of the pebbles would allow for effective decay
heat removal using the above effects.  However, this is dependent on the rate of transfer. 
2. In-core heat exchangers (heat pipes, cold fingers) are potentially very effective systems,
but will carry a substantial neutronic penalty due to streaming.  In addition, technological
difficulties (including the question of location of the ultimate heat sink and its impact on 
vessel/containment penetrations), reliability, and other safety impacts need to be explored 
in greater detail.
3. Forced circulation is very efficient: 3% of nominal flow will enable core cooling while 
fulfilling fuel temperature criteria.  Circulators of a very limited power (~ 100 KW) will
meet the temperature requirements, but are typically seen as active systems.
4. Natural convection of helium is sufficient with a top mounted HX at nominal pressure.
However, it requires a significant backpressure (which is a function of power density, HX 
elevation, core 'P, etc.) in the case of depressurization.
5. Heavy gas injection provides significant enhancement of natural circulation when 
compared with helium.  However, there may be a considerable temperature increase of
the injected gas, depending on the specific design of the system. 
Given these options, the following decay heat removal strategies will be pursued by the GFR: 
x Completely active systems (circulators, heat exchanger, valve).  These systems
would be classified as “safety”, redundant, and diversified.  PRA/reliability
analyses will be key for these systems. 
52
x Heavy gas injection, followed by natural circulation.  Key to this strategy is the 
design of the primary circuit and containment building to allow for sufficient
backpressure for a specified time.
x Well-balanced mix of passive, semi-passive, and active systems.  This is the 
ultimate goal for this reactor concept, and is similar to current advanced LWR
design paths.  This would include the combination of the best options (e.g., use of 
the injectable heavy gas to operate a blower, cold fingers combined with natural
circulation, etc.). 
In addition, design provisions favoring conduction paths, energy storage, etc., will continue to be 
investigated.
7. Future Work
More detailed types of thermal-hydraulic analyses and design work will be performed.  These 
evaluations will combine phenomena, such as internal heat sinks, heat transfer to and losses from
the external boundary, turbomachinery coastdown, and natural convection.  This integrated 
analysis will be done to justify the removal of conservatisms, and give best estimate results for 
trade studies comparisons/system optimizations.
Maintaining a backpressure within the containment (or proximate containment/PCRV/PCIV) is 
paramount to the proposed decay heat removal schemes, and a more detailed analysis will be 
performed during the optimization phase of the work. 
Work on the pebble bed long-term decay heat removal system will continue with an emphasis on 
assessing the requirements on the pebble transport system from the core to the ultimate long-term
storage configuration. An integrated analysis will be carried out.
Appendices
A.1 Accident Sequences
The sizing of decay heat removal systems and the question of whether or not passive heat
removal mechanisms can play a useful role is in a large part determined by the definition of the 
design basis.  Most accident sequences can be accommodated by the provision of reliable/highly 
reliable system design of which active decay heat removal systems are the key to long-term
recovery and stable cool down.  Depressurization accidents with activation of reactivity scram
systems can be accommodated when the main circulators and the active decay heat sinks are still
available.  Active shut down cooling system with auxiliary circulators and auxiliary heat removal
trains are normally designed to be aligned when the decay heat is down ~ 2% of normal power 
and the main systems are normally brought down. However this does all require a reliable power 
source for the mover. If off-site power is lost, then vital buses are switched to the emergency
power of which diesel generators are a prime example.  Depressurization initiators with loss of
off-site power and a loss of a shutdown train (single failure criteria) have all been accommodated
in the design basis of the earlier GCFRs.  However within the last twenty years with the 
occurrence of events such as TMI-2 and Chernobyl, and the whole role of beyond-design-basis 
and severe accidents with core melt down, the safety envelope has gradually reached the limits.
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Within the space of the last ten years the thermal gas cooled reactors have defined the safety 
boundaries.  Both the HTGR and the PBMR have claimed walk-away safety.  With the failure of 
reactivity scram systems, failure of active heat removal systems including the decay heat 
removal systems, total loss of electric power both off-site and emergency, and for 
depressurization events the position is that no core meltdown would occur.  Fuel failure could 
occur but these would be limited site release of fission products to the public.  Efforts are 
concurrently being made to remove the need for emergency zone evacuation.  Certainly the 
thermal gas reactor community has had to defend the issue of break size with the regulatory
authorities and have had to introduce innovative design features such as cross-vessels, instead of 
cross-ducts but not with standing, it is a significant achievement and sets a target of comparison.
However the fast reactor community also made similar progress on the sodium alternative, and 
the IFR program and the associated LMR program did also reach a comparable safety case 
before the programs were terminated.  Given this background, it would appear appropriate for 
the Gen IV GFR to have such a safety goal too.  From the viewpoint of decay heat removal 
accidents this would mean that protected depressurization initiators with total loss of electric 
power would not result in core meltdown.  In other words, a station blackout combined with a 
depressurization would not lead to a severe accident.  This is a major challenge and it should be 
understood that this postulated beyond-design basis accident is a very low probability event in 
residual risk space. 
This can be realized from the following discussion, taken from the I-NERI Project report [1], of 
the classical definition of design basis and beyond basis which outlines the traditional
understanding of the delineation of the accident groups within probability space. 
A.1.1 Design basis conditions 
Initiating faults to be considered within the design basis cover the whole range of faults from 
those which are likely to occur several times within the life of the plant to those whose 
occurrence is highly unlikely but for which the consequences must be evaluated and if necessary 
design measures taken to restrict them.  Postulated faults are assumed to occur within the design
basis and are called design basis initiating faults.  They may arise due to component failure,
operator errors, internal or external hazards.  Their consequences affect the plant behavior.  The 
design basis initiating faults studied are selected as the worst conditions representative of 
families of faults.  These are design basis events (DBEs).
Starting from a plant operating initial condition, a design basis condition is the changing plant 
condition which arise as a result of a design basis initiating fault combined with the conventional 
aggravating situations and the mitigating actions that are taken.  The normal operating conditions 
of the plant are also included in the design basis conditions.  The initiating faults to be 
considered in the design basis are assigned to three categories in addition to the normal operating 
conditions.  The frequency of the initiating faults is used as the guideline for their classification.
The design basis conditions are therefore grouped into four categories on the basis of the 
expected occurrence frequency of the corresponding initiating faults. 
Normal operating conditions
These are planned and required plant conditions. They include special conditions such as tests
during commissioning and start-up, part load, shutdown states, handling states, partial 
54
unavailability for inspection, test, maintenance and repair.  The decommissioning conditions are 
not included in the safety analysis of the operating plant.  They will be specifically analyzed at
an appropriate time.  Nevertheless, considerations concerning the decommissioning have to be 
made.
The goal of the safety analysis of normal operating conditions is to verify that their
consequences on the staff and the public are ALARA and in any case lower than the
corresponding release criteria. 
Category 2 operating conditions
These are operating conditions not planned but expected to occur one or more times during the 
life of the plant (mean occurrence frequency of the initiating event estimated to be greater than 
10-2 per year).  The plant shall be able to return to power to power in a short period after fault 
rectification.  The goal of the safety analysis of category 2 operating conditions is to verify that 
their consequences on the staff and the public are ALARA and in any case lower than the 
corresponding release criteria. 
Category 3 operating conditions
These are operating conditions not expected to occur during the life of the plant, but after which 
plant restart is required (mean occurrence frequency of the initiating event between 10-4 per year 
and 10-4 per year and 10-2 per year).  The goal of the safety analysis of category 3 operating 
conditions is to verify that their consequences on the public are lower than the corresponding 
release targets. 
Category 4 operating conditions
These are operating conditions after which plant restart is not required.  The consequences of the 
operating conditions must not exceed category 4 limits with a mean value of its frequency higher 
than 10-6 per year.  The goal of the safety analysis of category 4 operating conditions is to verify 
that their consequences on the public are lower than the corresponding release targets.
Internal and external hazards also have to be taken into account.  Depending upon frequency, 
these hazards can fall into one of the above three categories.  They are associated with an 
occurrence frequency and are analyzed with the rules corresponding to: 
x Category 2 operating conditions: internal flooding, extreme weather conditions…
x Category 3 operating conditions: fire, earthquake,… The level of the earthquake corresponds 
to the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) depending on the site characteristics. 
x Category 4 operating conditions: aircraft crash, external explosion, earthquake,… The level 
of the earthquake corresponds to the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) depending on the site 
characteristics.
A.1.2 Design extension conditions 
The design extension conditions are not defined on the basis of their occurrence frequency, but 
they are postulated to be bounding cases resulting from risks specific to the design or the 
process.  Two kinds of design extension conditions are considered, the situations for which the 
consequences have to be demonstrated to be limited, and the severe accidents.  These are beyond 
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design basis events (BDBEs).  The goal of the safety analysis of design extension conditions is to 
verify that their consequences to the public are lower than the limited release targets.
Complex sequences and limiting events
The consequences of complex sequences and limiting events are investigated.  This can lead to 
enhance the design in order to show that core damage is prevented, and therefore that the 
limiting release targets are not exceeded.
Severe accidents
Given the enhanced preventive safety, core damage accidents have any low occurrence 
frequency (the mean value of the cumulative core damage frequency is lower than the 
probabilistic target of 10-6 per year) and it is not realistic to do a sensible ranking of severe 
accidents.  Therefore, the severe accidents to consider are not classified on a probabilistic basis.
The goal of the analysis of severe accidents is to prove the effectiveness of the containment
measures for limiting the consequences of core damage accidents.  The radiological 
consequences shall be lower than the limiting release targets.  This can lead to enhancements of
the design in order to show that the limiting release targets are not exceeded.
A.1.3 Residual risk situations 
Residual risk situations are accident conditions for which the prevention is such that the analysis 
of their consequences is not required by the safety demonstration.  The adequacy of the 
prevention of these accident conditions has to be demonstrated.  Such a demonstration may be 
performed using probabilistic assessment.  In this case, the goal is to show that the accident 
conditions where the consequences may exceed the limiting release targets have a mean
frequency well below 10-7 per year.  The probabilistic safety assessment cannot be realistically 
used for innovative concepts with limited operating experience.  It is also not easily usable
during the conceptual design phase because of the lack of detailed design of system and 
equipment.  The demonstration of adequate prevention can be performed using the lines-of-
defense method.
It can be seen from this discussion that a station blackout combined with a depressurization event 
is a very low probability event.  This is the event that the GFR NERI and I-NERI projects have
been using to explore passive decay heat removal events.  This is the safety boundary set by the 
recent work of the HTGR and PBMR communities.  One possibility that should be explored 
which could facilitate the acceptance of the licensing case in this low probability space is 
combining active systems with passive systems.  A semi-passive approach such as autonomous
systems utilizing the reactor core decay heat or utilizing stored gas coolant inventory from the 
secondary side as the power source may make the design challenge less formidable.
A.2 RELAP5 Model Assumptions for Pebbled Bed Core Simulation 
The RELAP5/ATHENA model nodalization used for the simulation of natural convection in the 
600MWt (50w/cc) pebble bed reactor design [4,5,6,7] is shown in Fig. A-1.  Details of this 
nodalization are given below. 
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Nominal Channel 
The grid plate is 0.25 m thick and its porosity is the same as the pebble-bed core, 0.387. 
For simplicity, since the grid plate has not been designed, wherever reasonable, the grid plate 
hydraulic parameters will be assumed to be the same as those for the pebble bed.  Thus, the 
hydraulic diameter, flow area, and relative roughness will be assumed to be the same as the 
pebble bed.  The average (i.e., nominal) channel hydraulic diameter is shown below to be 
0.02525 m.  This was done so that the friction pressure drop in the pebble bed would agree with 
the Achenbach relationships.  This is a good size for the grid plate holes because it is somewhat
smaller than the pebble diameter (i.e., 63.1% of it), but not so small that it greatly restricts flow
and requires a needlessly large number of holes. The hole diameter, of course, is the hydraulic
diameter for the grid plate will be the definition of hydraulic diameter.  This choice will results in 
the grid plate pressure drop being about two orders magnitude lower than that for a pebble bed of 
the same height. 
The grid plate heat structure will be modeled as if the material around each hole in the grid plate 
were a concentric annulus.  The inner surface of the annulus is assumed to be connected to the 
adjacent channel coolant volume and the outer radius is assumed to be insulated.  The inner 
(hole) diameter is assumed to be 0.02525 m, as explained above.  The void fraction for the grid 
plate will also be assumed to be the same as that for the pebble bed, 0.387.  The outer diameter
of this annulus must be the hole diameter divided by the square root of the pebble-bed void 
fraction, if the void fraction for the grid plate is to be the same as that of the pebble bed.  (This is 
because the area of the hole divided by the area of a solid disk of the diameter of the outer 
diameter must equal the void fraction.)  Thus, the outer diameter of the annulus, i.e., grid plate 
heat structure, is 0.04059 m.  Thus, the left boundary for the heat structure is at 0.02525/2 m  =
0.012625 m and the right boundary is at 0.04059/2 m = 0.020295 m.
For the heat structure representation of the grid plate 5 annular volumes were chosen with the 
thinner ones closer the coolant boundary condition at the center.  The first 3 nodes are 1 mm
thick each, the next 1 is 1 mm thick, and the last one is 2.67 mm.  For the pebble bed heat 
structure, the radii were selected to produce 10 essentially equal volumes.  The lower and upper 
axial reflectors are each 0.5 m thick and are made of unfueled pebbles. All of the pebbles are 
SiC.  The pebble diameter is 4 cm = 0.040 m.  The core diameter is 3.00 m.  The core height for 
300 MWt and 25 W/cc is (300/25)/(ʌ×1.52) m = 1.697652726 m = ~1.698 m.  The same
hydraulic diameter, flow area, and relative roughness are used for the grid plate as are used for 
the core pebble bed.  The K-loss into the grid plate is 0.1 and 1.0 for reverse flow. 
For the pebble bed modeling:
The void fraction for the pebble bed is 0.387. 
The average channel flow area is: 0.387×ʌ×1.52 m2 = 2.736 m2.
The average channel hydraulic diameter is 0.387/(1-0.387)×0.04 m = 0.02525 m.
The average channel relative roughness = 10-6.
Since the flow area for the grid plate is assumed to be that of the pebble-bed regions, the number
of holes is the pebble-bed flow area divided by the flow area of one grid plate hole.  Thus the 
number of holes is 2.736/( ʌ/4×0.025252) =  5464.  Thus, the heat transfer area for the grid plate 
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is 5464×ʌ×0.02525×0.25 m2 = 108.4 m2.  The area of the insulated outer diameter surface of the 
grid-plate heat structure is 5464×ʌ×0.04059×0.25 m2 = 174.2 m2.  (174.256 m2 had to be input 
so that the inner/outer surfaces of the annulus have consistent surface areas.  0.04059/0.02525 × 
108.4 m2 = 174.256 m2 and not 174.2 m2, which caused an error message.)
The pebble surface area is the area of one pebble times the number of pebbles.  The core volume
is:  300 MWt/(25 MWt/m3) = 12 m3.  The volume of pebbles is (1 – 0.387) × 12 m3 and volume
of 1 pebble is ʌ/6×0.04 m3.  Thus, the number of pebbles is: 
((1 – 0.387) × 12 m3)/( ʌ/6×0.04 m3) = 219,514.  The surface area of 1 pebble is ʌ×0.042 m2.
Thus, the total surface area of the core is 219,514×ʌ×0.042 m2 = 1103.40 m2.  The surface area of 
one of the five equal-length core volumes is 1103.40/5 m2 = 220.68 m2.  The core height is 1.698 
m and each of the two volumes of the lower and upper axial reflectors are 0.25 m long (i.e. two 
0.25m lower reflector volumes and two 0.25 m upper reflector volumes).   Thus the surface area 
of each equal-length reflector volume is 0.25/1.698 × 1103.40 m2 = 162.46 m2.
In a heat structure a “mesh point” is actually a point.  There would be one on each boundary, one 
at each interface between heat structure materials, and some distributed within each material
layer.  The number of intervals must be 1 less than the number of mesh points.  For the axial 
power shape used the peak power was 1.32 times that average.  The axial length was divided into
100 pieces and the relative power for each was provided.  Based on this the axial temperature at 
the exit of each piece can be determined by trapezoidal integration.  Then the temperature rise at 
over each 20% slice of the core can be obtained the fractional temperature rise, i.e., the rise for 
the 20% slice divided by the total temperature rise of 370º C can be obtained.  The five numbers
thus obtained from bottom to top are: 0.1296, 0.2292, 0.2624, 0.2292, and 0.1396 (which adds up 
to 1.000, as it should).  These five factors were entered as the axial power factors. 
For the pebble-bed regions, a fouling factor of 3.5, which increases the heat transfer because it is 
greater than 1, was used for the pebble region.  This is based on a separate analysis that compares
the RELAP5 and Achenbach Nusselt number correlations.  For the grid plate no fouling factor 
was applied, i.e., a value of 1.0 was assumed.
The nominal channel was first developed as a stand-alone model. A time-dependent volume at 
the inlet connects to the channel via a time-dependent junction.  The exit is connected via a 
regular junction to another time dependent volume.  The plan is to add branches to other
components around the loop and use trip logic to in effect remove the time-dependent volumes
from the circuit.
Time-Dependent Volume 100 is the nominal channel source. 
Time-Dependent Junction 101 connects Volumes 100 & 102. 
Pipe 102 has 10 nodes and is the nominal channel including flows through the grid plate (node 
1), lower axial reflector (nodes 2 and 3), core (nodes 4 through 8) and upper axial reflector
(nodes 9 and 10). 
Normal Junction 103 connects Volumes 102 & 104. 
Time-Dependent Volume 104 is the sink for the nominal channel. 
Heat structure 1021 is of cylindrical (annular) geometry and has only 1 node and is the grid plate. 
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Heat structure 1022 is of spherical geometry and has 9 nodes to correspond to the nine pebble-
bed region nodes of the nominal channel (2 lower reflector, 5 core, and 2 upper reflector).  (Note 
that there is a 1-node mismatch between the fluid nodes and the upper nine heat structure nodes.) 
Emergency Heat Exchanger (HEATRIC) 
The heat exchanger design is based on the July 14, 2003 I-NERI design.  Heatric heat exchangers 
are being considered for the emergency heat exchangers in the GFR.  All of the channels are 
straight and parallel for both fluids.  All of the channels are half circles with a diameter of 5.0 
mm (millimeters!) and, of course, a radius of 2.5 mm.  All of these half circles are aligned one 
above the other in all layers.  The I-NERI project is considering a face area of 2.3 m by 2.3 m
and that this corresponds to 129,491 channels per fluid.  Because of the very small channel size, 
laminar flow is expected in the channels.  For carbon dioxide as the primary coolant, the project 
proposes using a 0.42 m long heat exchanger and for helium on the primary side, a 1.00 m long 
heat exchanger is proposed.
Based on the above helium-side of the heat exchanger will consist of 129,491 parallel channels, 
each 1 m long and with a flow cross section of a half circle that is 2.5 mm in radius.  The flow 
area each channel is ʌ×(2.5 mm)2/2 and the combined flow area is 1.27127492 m2, or 
approximately 1.27 m2.  The hydraulic diameter is 4×( ʌ×(2.5 mm)2/2)/(ʌ×2.5 mm +5.0 mm) = 
3.055077352 mm, or about 0.00306 m.  The cross sectional area of the steel walls in (2.3 m)2 – 
2×129,491×ʌ×(2.5 mm)2/2 = 2.747450161 m2, which when divided by the number of channel, 
2×129,491, is 1.060865296e-5 m2 per channel.  Each channel has a perimeter of (ʌ×2.5 + 5) mm.
Therefore, the average wall thickness around each channel is 0.8253203763 mm.  Thus, we can 
think of this heat exchange as having 2×129,491 tube, each with a wall thickness of about 0.825 
mm and all of the tubes are parallel and pressed together.  Thus, the separation from a primary
tube to a secondary one is two wall thickness, or about 1.65 mm.  In the model the heatric 
emergency heat exchanger will be treated as being a series of alternating parallel plates, each of 
thickness 1.65 mm.  The heat transfer area on each side (primary or secondary) of the plates will 
the surface area of one channel times the number of channels.  Thus, the surface area is 
129,491×( ʌ×2.5 + 5) mm × 1 m = 1664.474936 m2 and since there are 5 equal axial nodes in the
model, each is 332.8949872 m2, which will be rounded off to 333. m2.
Downcomer
The downcomer annulus is assumed to be 1-foot thick.  Therefore, its hydraulic diameter is 2 
feet, or 0.6096 m.
PCU
The volume, pressure, and temperature for the 1-node PCU volume were taken from the I-NERI 
design.  This was done on a spreadsheet and reflects the exclusion of the electric generator 
volume.  The volume in the RELAP5 model is 730 m3 and is rounded off from the 731.84 m3
value in the spreadsheet. Similarly, 3.513 MPa was rounded to 3.5 MPa in the model and 
447.279º C was rounded to 450º C in the model. The spreadsheet showed that the equilibrium
pressure for the plant (i.e., loss of site power without depressurization was 45.5 MPa.  The length 
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of this volume was taken to be ¥2 m and to be angled downward at 45º so that it would go 1 m
across and 1 m down from the outlet plenum to the down comer in the model.  In order to obtain 
a more accurate set of volumes and pressures for the PCU nodes (2 equal nodes in the model,
nodes 118 and 126) the excel spreadsheet model for the containment was adapted.  The primary
system volume without the PCU nodes was calculated from the RELAP output to be 283 m3 and 
temperature was estimated to be 940 K, and the initial pressure was estimated to 7.05 MPa.  For 
the 4.5 MPa final pressure case, a PCU pressure of 3.5 MPa, and a temperature of 450 K, were 
assumed, and the spreadsheet was used to solve for a volume of 721.65 m3 which was divided in 
two and around off to 361 m3 per volume.  For the 2.0 MPa case the pressure was arbitrarily set 
at 1.0 MPa in the pcu and the 450 K temperature was assumed.  The spreadsheet was used to 
solve for a volume that yielded a final pressure of 2.0 MPa.  This volume is 1429.15 m3, which 
was divided into two and rounded off to 715 m3.
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Figure A.2.1  RELAP5/ATHENA Nodalization for 600 MWt Pebble Bed Plant 
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A.3 RELAP5-3D/ATHENA Models for Block Core 
The calculations of this study were performed using the RELAP5-3D/ATHENA [18] computer
code.  In the RELAP model, helium (primary coolant), dry air (containment environment), and 
CO2 (supplemental fluid) are used as the working fluids.  Heat transfer in the heat structures that 
model the physical components of the reactor is calculated using one-dimensional radial heat 
conduction.  Heat transfer from the heat structures to the adjacent coolant is modeled with 
convective heat transfer while a radiation and conduction enclosure model allows for direct 
thermal communication between heat structures.
In order to better capture the thermal interactions between the various reactor components, it was 
desired that this RELAP LOCA analysis model an essentially complete reactor system.  Since 
the current GFR design is still in development, several assumptions about the reactor’s physical 
characteristics were required.  These characteristics are dynamic and will evolve as the reactor
design progresses; however defining these characteristics allows the analysis to proceed beyond 
the simplistic control volume calculations.
A.3.1 GFR Design Characteristics
The RELAP analysis models the reactor vessel, reactor cavity, and the reactor cavity cooling
system (RCCS).  In order to derive dimensions for these components, information was required 
on the core design.  For this purpose, the MIT GFR core design [4] (Figure A.3.1) was used.  The 
MIT design features a prismatic fuel assembly that is comprised of “compacts”, which include 
the spherical fuel encapsulated in a thin SiC shell.  The MIT design, refer to Table A.3.1, 
specifies the fuel assembly dimensions, coolant void fraction, and core arrangement.
In Figure A.3.1, three distinct regions of the core are observed: the fuel, reflector, and shield.
The RELAP model depicts these three regions as five radial rings: an inner, middle, and outer 
fuel ring, the reflector ring, and the shield ring.  The fuel region was divided into three radial 
rings in order to better model the fuel’s thermal response during transients.  Using the physical 
characteristics of the fuel assemblies, the radial lengths of the rings were determined as shown in 
Figure A.3.2.  In the figure, a coolant downcomer and the reactor vessel were added to the core; 
the dimensions of these two structures coming from the GA Modular Helium Reactor design 
[19].
The five radial rings of the core provided a core radius of 2.366 m and correspondingly a core 
area of 17.58 m2 and volume of 29.9 m3.  With these dimensions, the inner diameter of the 
pressure vessel is 5.76 m.
The dimensions of the core height are based upon a schematic of a French GFR design, see 
Figure A.3.3.  This design shows a concentric arrangement for the inlet and outlet coolant pipes, 
the reactor vessel being part of the coolant downcomer, coolant upflow through core supports, 
lower reflector, fuel, upper reflector, and a large gas plenum above the core to promote turbulent 
mixing of the hot coolant.  Figure A.3.4 illustrates how the RELAP model incorporates the 
physical arrangement described in Figure A.3.3. 
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In Figure A.3.4, the inlet and outlet pipe diameters are based on the dimensions of the GA MHR.
The heights of the upper and lower reflectors are based on input from INEEL GFR neutronic 
calculations.  Lastly, the gas plenum area was derived by scaling the areas of the French design. 
Having an estimate of the reactor vessel’s dimensions, it was possible to estimate the 
containment vessel’s size.  The axial distribution within the containment vessel is as follows: 1) 
two meter height below the reactor vessel for the control rod assembly and vessel support, 2) two 
meter height for the inlet plenum at the bottom of the reactor vessel, 3) 0.57 m height for core 
support, 4) 0.15 m height for lower reflector, 5) 1.7 m height for core region {subdivided into 
five axial regions for better thermal modeling}, 6) 0.15 m height for upper reflector, 7) 4.5 m
height for above-core gas plenum, and 8) one m height for the outlet plenum.  Taking into 
consideration the vertical space required for overhead cranes and to initially install the reactor 
vessel, a height of 11.93 m above the reactor vessel is selected.  Allowing a horizontal distance 
of 6.10 m adjacent to the reactor vessel for system support components, a containment volume of 
6285 m3 is calculated.  A schematic of the above dimensions is presented in Figure A.3.5.  Note 
in Figure A.3.5 that the reactor vessel is below grade. 
It is important to remember that the ultimate goal of the RELAP modeling is to incorporate a 
majority of the standard reactor systems that will directly influence the reactor’s thermal
performance during a LOCA transient.  To this end, it was decided to fully model the Reactor 
Cavity Cooling System (RCCS) specified in the GA MHTR design.  The RCCS uses natural 
draft air and has no pumps, circulators, valves, or any active components.  During normal reactor 
operations, GA analyses suggested that the RCCS removed 3300 kW of power.
The RCCS in this RELAP model consists of a cooling panel that attaches to cold air downcomers
and hot air risers.  The panel is located inside the reactor cavity and it surrounds the reactor 
vessel.  Air is introduced to and exhausted from the panel via an inlet/outlet structure that resides
on top of the containment vessel.  Cold atmospheric air enters the RCCS and flows downward to 
the cooling panel via gravity.  During this downward flow, the cold air is shielded from the 
reactor vessel’s radiative and convective heat.  At the bottom of the downcomer, the cold air 
enters a riser that faces the reactor vessel.  The vessel’s heat imparts buoyancy to the air and the 
air rises, collecting heat, as it moves upward towards the outlet structure to be exhausted into the 
atmosphere.
A.3.2 RELAP Model 
a. Geometry
Figure A.3.6 illustrates the complete RELAP model for the He-cooled GFR.  The reactor vessel
and its internals are shown in the left of the figure while the RCCS is shown on the right.  The 
model assumes symmetry and thus portrays only the left side of the reactor.  In the figure, there 
is the reactor vessel (#1000), the reactor head (#1001), the coolant downcomer (#120), the five 
radial rings that comprise the fuel, reflector, and shield (#140 - #148), the inlet plenum (#130), 
the core supports (#1404 - #1484), the lower reflectors (#1403 - #1483), the upper reflectors 
(#1402 - #1482), the gas plenum (#160), the outlet plenum (#170), the inlet pipe (#110) and the 
outlet pipe (#180).  In the figure, the inlet and outlet pipes are drawn on different planes, but the 
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RELAP model is actually for two concentric pipes, see Figure A.3.7.  The inlet pipe is insulated
from the outlet pipe in order to prevent parasitic heating of the inlet gas stream.
The coolant heat exchangers and the turbine are not explicitly modeled.  Instead, time-dependent
volumes are used at the inlet and outlet.  The He gas temperature in the outlet plenum is used to 
control the flow rate from the inlet time-dependent volume.  Similarly, the He pressure in the 
inlet plenum is used to control the pressure in the output time-dependent volume.
The conduction enclosure model allows heat to conduct radially from the inner fuel ring out 
through the RCCS and to the containment vessel.  Conduction can also occur from the core 
supports up to the reactor vessel’s head.  It is anticipated that the majority of the reactor’s heat 
will be conducted radially.  The model’s radial mesh is very fine in the core region and a little 
coarser in the non-core regions.  The radiation enclosure model allows heat to radiate both 
axially and radially from the core in a manner similar to that for the conduction enclosure model.
The containment vessel is shown in Figure A.3.6 as #900.  The reactor vessel and the RCCS 
communicate with the containment vessel via conduction.  During normal operations, the 
containment vessel is filled with dry air that is maintained at atmospheric temperatures and 
pressures.  The model does not account for air leakage from the containment.  The containment
wall is modeled as having a stainless steel liner, one meter of concrete, a water moat adjacent to 
the exterior, and then soil adjacent to the water.  The water moat was suggested in the MIT report 
as a heat sink to enhance heat removal from the containment’s wall. 
b. Neutronics 
The RELAP point kinetics option is used is used in the model, which allowed the fuel region to 
have a reactor power of 600 MW and a power density of 67 MW/m3 (slightly higher power 
density due to smaller core size).  The MIT design specifies an axial peaking factor of 1.25, 
however since this is a safety analysis, a more conservative peaking factor of 1.3 was used. 
Doppler feedback reactivity was not included since this effect was assumed to be small for the 
fast spectrum of the GFR.  At the onset of the LOCA, a SCRAM reactivity curve is applied.
This curve is from the Seabrook plant, which is not a fast gas reactor, however, the SCRAM
reactivity curve is believed to be more realistic than linearly ramping the reactivity down to zero. 
c. Material 
The materials for the GFR reactor vessel components were selected to be consistent with the
latest GFR design specifications.  The materials used in the RELAP model are shown in Table 
A.3.2.  In certain cases, only one data point was available and in these cases the material
properties were considered constant for the temperature range of reactor operations.
A.3.3 Loss of Coolant Accident 
The RELAP model includes provisions for simulating a LOCA scenario.  The LOCA is assumed
to be a double-guillotine break in the inlet/outlet pipes, which would spill He into the 
containment vessel.  The model uses four valves to simulate the double-guillotine break.  There 
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are divertor valves on both the inlet and outlet pipes.  When the break occurs, the two valves 
open and He is allowed to flow into the containment vessel.  Simultaneously, two valves close at 
the inlet/outlet time dependent volumes and the residual He in these lines also spills into the 
containment vessel.    Figure A.3.8 shows the fluid path from the primary loop to the 
containment vessel.  RELAP calculates the temperature and pressure responses in both the 
containment and the reactor vessel during the transient.
A LOCA analysis will be performed following the quality check of the RELAP model, which is 
in progress.  Subsequent to this analysis, the model will be revised to use a flow enhancement
system in which CO2 flow from a reservoir turns a vane that produces circulation of the He 
during the LOCA.
A.3.4 Conclusions 
A RELAP model has been created for the typical GFR design.  This model includes critical
power plant components such as the fuel, reflector, shield, reactor vessel, and containment
building.  To take advantage of passive systems for removing decay heat, a draft air reactor 
cavity cooling system is included in the model, as well as a water moat adjacent to the
containment vessel wall.  The process of creating the model highlighted several design
characteristics (e.g., material properties, fuel reactivity feedback) that require further definition 
in order to improve the modeling accuracy. 
Table A.3.1. Reference GFR Parameters
Thermal power 600 MW
Average power density 55 MW/m3
Axial power peaking 1.25*
Core height 1.7 m
System pressure 7.0 MPa 
Inlet coolant temperature 490 (C
Outlet coolant temperature 850 (C
Fuel hexagonal matrix block,
UPuC/SiC (50/50%) 
Number of fuel assemblies 127*
Width of fuel assembly 20 cm*
Number of coolant holes 91*
Coolant void fraction 40%*
                                 * MIT parameter
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Table A.3.2. Material Properties for GFR Reactor Components
Component Material RELAP Model
Reactor vessel T91 (9Cr-1Mo) steel F(t)
Reactor head T91 (9Cr-1Mo) steel F(t)
Fuel ring U-SiC compact F(t)
Upper reflector Be constant
Lower reflector Be constant
Radial reflector Be constant
Shield Ti constant
Core barrel Incoloy alloy 800 F(t)
Figure A.3.1. MIT Prismatic GFR core 
design.
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Ring 4 = reflector (Be)
Ring 5 = shield  (Ti)
Ring 6 = downcomer (Incoloy 800)
Ring 7 = reactor vessel  (T91 Steel)
Ring 1 = fuel  (fuel compact)
Ring 2 = fuel
Ring 3 = fuel
Figure A.3.2. Radial profile of the INEEL RELAP GFR core. 
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Figure A.3.3. Schematic of a 
French design for the GFR. 
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 grade 5.76 m
18 m
6.10 m
A = %r2 = 254.47 m2
V = A*h = 6285.38 m3
2.00
2.00
0.57
0.15
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.34
1.125
0.15
1.125
1.125
1.125
11.93
1.0
Figure A.3.5. Calculated containment vessel dimensions.
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Core Support
2.4 m
ID = 1.63 m
Lower reflector0.15 m
0.57 m
Upper reflector0.15 m
ID = 1.43 m
Figure A.3.4.  Schematic of RELAP model of GFR reactor vessel. 
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Figure A.3.6. Complete RELAP/ATHENA GFR model
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Figure A.3.7. 3D 
image of RELAP 
model for GFR 
LOCA scenario 
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Figure A.3.8. Seabrook SCRAM reactivity curve used in GFR model
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Figure A.3.9. Illustration of 
flow path from the primary 
loop to the containment
vessel during a LOCA 
scenario
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